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By the beginning of the Third Millennium, donors reassessed the aid architecture and 
adopted a new aid regime based on the partnership principles to attain poverty 
reduction. Harmonization is one of core principles to increase aid effectiveness 
because it has potential benefits for donors through minimizing transaction costs and 
for recipient countries by improving the predictability of budget aid. However, 
empirical studies and international reports showed that the degree of harmonization is 
limited. The thesis attempts to explore the possible causes behind limited progress in 
this principle between 2005 and 2010 through comparing aid policies of two main 
donor countries in Africa: The United Kingdom and Demark towards Tanzania and 
Ghana. 
The thesis finds that the British and Danish aid polices as declared have been affected 
by Paris principles; nevertheless, their harmonized operations have been conducted on 
multilateral manner. On the recipient side, the adequate capabilities of Ghanaian 
governments in addition to the availability of natural resources have enabled the 
governments to employ harmonized aid while Tanzanian governments have not been 










Statement of the Problem 
Foreign aid simply resembles a mutual relation between donors and recipients. 
According to donor, it is an effective tool to achieve foreign policy goals and from 
recipients' perspectives, it is an important source of financing development projects 
and programs. The aid architecture* institutionalized after the Second World War 
through Bretton Woods Institutions; nevertheless, with the beginning of the third 
millennium, donors reassessed the aid architecture and adopted a new architecture 
based on the notion of partnership. Partnership has been developed to regulate the 
relation between donors and recipients on the base of reciprocity and it is interpreted 
in Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. The declaration sets five 
"Partnership Commitments" that became a procedural framework on aid effectiveness 
and donors attained to meet all partnership commitments by 2010; thus a survey on 
monitoring the Paris Declaration was conducted before the meeting of high level 
forum on aid effectiveness in South Korea in November 2011. The survey shows 
modest performance from donors. A significant progress is reported just in the fourth 
principle "managing for result" in addition to major reforms occurred in recipient 
countries regarding formulating development policies and financial structure.  
Regarding the third principle "harmonization"; it is related to ownership and 
alignment principles because attaining harmonization in terms of less proliferation, 
less duplication and transparency means step forward to achieve benefits of the other 
two principles. The aforementioned survey shows that donors succeeded in achieving 
 
 * The International Development Association (IDA) in the World Bank (2007) identifies aid 




one indicator of aid harmonization which is technical cooperation; however, other 
indicators such as the uses of program-based approach, the coordination of donor 
missions and analytic works have not been accomplished yet.  
In this context, the main research question of the thesis is "what are the possible 
causes behind the limited progress in implementing the principle of 
harmonization between 2005 and 2010 by comparing aid policies of two donor 
countries (United Kingdom and Demark) towards two African countries 
(Tanzania and Ghana)". And this question shall be answered through examining 
and analyzing the following items: 
- The scope and degree of each donor's commitment to the international and 
regional initiatives on aid effectiveness.  
- The similarities and differences in aid harmonization between the two donors 
in the two recipient countries.  
- The role of recipient countries in endorsing aid harmonization.  
Review of the literature 
 Literature on aid harmonization might be divided into two categories: the first 
category discuses aid coordination as one aspect of aid effectiveness and tackles it in 
the volume included the various principles of aid effectiveness; while the second 
category focuses on imperatives of aid coordination.  
Regarding the literature that handles aid harmonization generally, Owen Barder 
(2006) affirmed that foreign aid has actually achieved notable growth in developing 
countries. However, he urged that increasing aid to the poorest countries to attain 
millennium development goals (MDGs) might lead to negative impacts because of 
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three types of constrains: micro economic (ex. transactional costs), macroeconomic 
(ex. Dutch Diseases) and political economy (ex. corruption). Barder concluded that to 
overcome those constraints, donor ought to coordinate their aid policies and direct 
their disbursement to government budget in order to limit duplication and 
proliferation. William Easterly (2006) in his well known book "The White Man's 
Burden: Why the west's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good" 
criticized donors polices because donors used to handle developing countries' 
problems as technical problems (planners' approach) and they ignored the specificity 
of each country. Thus he urged that donors ought to indicate their foreign aid policy 
according to (searchers' approach) because poverty is a multi dimensional problem.  
On the other hand, there are literature that tackled harmonization through certain 
approach and I will refer only to two of these approaches; the first is the institutional 
approach, Gibson,Clark, et al.(2005) analyzed aid effectiveness in term of incentives 
within institutions in donor and recipient countries. The main argument is that 
incentives within institutional process might foster or hinder effectiveness of 
development aid. Authors examined perverse incentives in collective action situations 
on individual, national, and international levels. For donors, the collective action 
problems that mitigate aid effectiveness are informational problems and other 
problems caused by insufficient institutions. It's worth to mention that the 
informational problems includes lack of asymmetric information about the 
characteristics of each community and these problems occur when the donor countries 
do not recognize or appreciate local knowledge so that aid is not delivered to the real 
beneficiaries. While problems of insufficient institutions are related to adopting new 
rules, rent seeking, and corruption; and these problems take place in both donor and 
recipient countries and lead to unproductive outcomes.  
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Principal – agent setting is the second approach; AlessiaIsopi and George Mavrotas 
(2009) explored determinants of aid allocation and found out that some donors 
allocate aid for the poorest and others according to the performance of recipient. In 
addition, the authors investigated policy coherence in donor country and whether 
donors adopt aid policy corresponded with trade policy.  
On the other side, African intellectuals have tackled aid effectiveness with the 
ultimate goal of ending aid therefore the point of departure is redefiniting the concept 
of development.  Samir Amin (2009) one of dependency theorists argues that to end 
aid dependency, African countries have to reorient the definition and indicators of 
development. First Amin questions the legitimacy of international institutions that 
governed aid disbursements from the North to the South, namely the OECD, the EU, 
the WB as they represent donor countries he described them 'tried states' as they share 
same liberal globalization economically and politically and that mirrored in their aid 
agenda. Therefore, he believes that the UN General Assembly is the legitimate organ 
to formulate and monitor aid relations. On the other side, Amin criticized two trends 
in the international aid discourse: aid volume and aid performance. Regarding aid 
volume; Amin argues that global aid should be transferred according to the 'capacity 
of absorption' not the 'political objectives' of donors. Moreover, aid volume should be 
measured based on the effectiveness of development strategies that aim to decrease 
received amount; accordingly, he calls for abandoning the debate of increasing 
international commitment of aid volume from 0.7% to 1% of GNI. Concerning aid 
performance, Amin suggests that it has to be evaluated not only by the indicators of 
growth; employment and the production system but by 'aid ability of its own 
redundancy' as well. Therefore, he described the indicators were set in the Paris 
Declaration as 'a jungle of 12 (illegible) performance matrices and a rating system 
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inspired by the used for the solvability of banks. This procedure is no doubt attractive 
to bureaucrats but it is certainly useless for the rest of us' (p. 62).   
The African scholar Yash Tandon (2009) argues in his book 'Ending Aid Dependence' 
that development not aid is the core concept that recipient countries have to define it. 
He defined development as a combine of social factor and democratic factor with 
exclusion of imperial factor. In this regard, Tandon is inspired by Nyerere's approach 
that is built on participating of all national segments in the society; in addition to self 
reliance. According to this definition, terms of growth and wealth are not components 
in development. Tondon identifies five causes of aid dependency: 1) the structure of 
international system that has gone from colonial powers and colonies then developed 
and developing countries and the international organizations support this dichotomy. 
2) Everlasting financial and social impediments in African countries limit their ability 
to reproduce alternative development resources.3) aid readiness, acquiring aid 
disbursements is easier than mobilizing national resources. 4) 'A psychology of aid 
dependency' in the South is combined with weak and corrupted institutions and 
absence of leadership. 5) In the situation of refusing aid by the South leaders, they 
have been blamed by donors and media that they are working against national interest 
in eradicating poverty.  
However, Tim Murithi (2009) believes that international aid architecture is the second 
face of colonization because it is built on liberal economic policies as a result it is 
used to  manipulate, control and coerce the recipient into fulfilling the donor's 
agenda' (p.3). On the other side, Murithi blames political elite in African countries 
because they became 'addicted to donors fund' gradually governments have not been 
able to operate their functions in development planning and resources allocation due 
to corruption.  
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Furthermore, Murithi criticized donors' discourses regarding the notion of aid 
effectiveness, he argues that this notion focuses on procedures and discards the real 
function of aid which is achieving impact. Also attaining MDGs by 2015 is not a 
reachable goal because poverty indicators and statistics still show the miserable 
reality of African population.  
The second category of literature undertakes aid harmonization separately; it 
examines problems that occurred due to aid fragmentation. Maija Halonen-
Akatwijuka (2004) explained causes of coordination failure; they argued that when 
donors have similar preferences, coordination would be deterred because they direct 
their disbursements to the same sectors. in addition, asymmetries of information 
among donors themselves lead to concentrate aid allocation on one sector and lower 
priority sectors do not get disbursements; on the other hand, donors prefers to direct 
aid to social sector not public expenditure due to seeking visibility.  
Aid proliferation is another cause of fragmentation; Iñaki Aldasoro. et al., (2009) 
argued that the most of donors on real field do not implement aid concentration to 
ultimate aid outcomes though they declared their commitment to aid effectiveness. 
Through empirical investigation, authors found that few donors specialize in certain 
sector and decrease its proliferation thus they concluded that it is difficult to apply 
coordination. To limit aid proliferation; Jacky Amprou.et al. (2005) argued that 
donors have to select recipient countries. Authors demonstrate various types of 
criteria to select and limit proliferation corresponding with objectives of aid allocation 
(ex. alleviate poverty, economic growth, democracy and human rights); indeed, 
characteristics of recipient (its economic vulnerability, status of conflict) could be 
determinants of selectivity. They concluded that donors have to agree on common 
criteria of selectivity besides the criteria of each donor; where donors should share 
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their criteria to ensure better aid allocation. While ArnabAcharyaa. et al.(2006) 
focused on the problem of transactions costs; they argued that increasing aid 
proliferation leads to increase transactions costs. They explored determinants of aid 
allocation or allocation pattern of major donors and they developed index to measure 
proliferation. They found that aid proliferation increased transactions because each 
project needs separate negotiations and tools of management such as financial 
arrangements, phases of monitoring, and indirect costs. On the other hand, 
expenditures of activities such as training and lack of responsibility of recipients 
cause transaction costs.  
Yutaka Arimoto and Hisaki Kono,(2009) shed the light on recurrent costs as a  
another problem of aid fragmentation, as they argued that less proliferation have 
positive impacts on development because donors specify aid allocation and that will 
decrease recurrent cost for recipient country but what happened in the reality that 
donors allocate aid and recurrent cost separately. Authors recommended that donors 
have to allocate aid to national budget to reduce aid ineffectiveness. 
 Though the mainstream of literature on aid effectiveness argues for the importance of 
aid harmonization, some scholars claimed that coordination among donors makes aid 
outcome unproductive. Karl R. Pedersen (2001) and Gaute Torsvik (2005) argued that 
though donors aim to alleviate poverty, aid flows in cooperative way might lead to 
counter results and lead to more poverty. Their explanation is that recipient countries 
depend heavily on donors, who "crowdedly" support poor and they carry out activities 
that eradicate poverty while recipient countries do less effort to overcome poverty so 
the domestic policies would not work effectively. Pedersen argues that applying 
conditionality could not prevent recipient from this behavior because "altruistic" 
donor do not intervene in domestic policies and in distribution of income in particular. 
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Accordingly, author concluded that it is important to reconsider incentives of recipient 
countries. On the contrary, Torsvik argued that conditions might be a good solution 
and he urged that donors should enforce contingent aid contracts as the relation 
between donor and recipient is a principal – agent relation.   
Statement of Need  
From the above-mentioned literature review, it is clear that scholars handled causes of 
aid fragmentation separately; not through comprehensive analysis because the most of 
the studies are empirical and the unit of analysis is aid agency. Furthermore, the most 
of studies that conducted in the BWIs and in the West have considered the eight goals 
of the millennium are the only indicators of development. So scholars have tackled 
aid effectiveness from this scope though they believe that the needs and milieu of 
poor countries are different and countries require various types and scopes of 
intervention. On the contrary, African scholars do not consider the concept of aid 
effectiveness because they argue for aid independency. Therefore, they have refuted 
the definition and measures of development that evolved by BWIs. Moreover, there 
are limited analytical studies that investigated the role of the recipient in aid 
management. Accordingly, the thesis will start from identifying boundaries of the 
concept of harmonization, then it will explore motives of aid harmonization and the 
country's aid policy will be the unit of analysis; also this study aspires to investigate 
how the capacity of recipient countries affects the degree of harmonization.     
Theoretical Framework 
There are various reasons to explain why donors allocate aid to developing countries; 
the architecture of foreign aid became a determinant of aid allocation policy with the 
beginning of the third millennium and the thesis will focus on this determinant.  
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Regarding donors' motives, Mark McGillivray et al. (2002) determined three major 
motives: political, commercial and development. Their empirical study that 
investigated the behavior of four donors (France, U.K, USA, and Japan) from 1977 to 
1997 showed that political and economic interests not development needs compelled 
donors' aid policy. Riddell,R. (2007) added five motives: emergency, solidarity, 
historical ties, providing public good and promoting human rights. Javed Younas 
(2008) Kim Richard Nossal (1988) also mentioned in their studies those motives. 
While Dane Rowlands and Ian Ketcheson (2002) in discussing Canadian aid policy; 
they stated that altruism, bureaucratic influence, responsive of recipient country affect 
donor aid allocation policy. What is important in their study that they adopted the 
systemic determinant "that looks at the role other donors plays in shaping ODA 
policy, either through the sharing of information, strategic competition, or the 
outright coordination of aid flows" (P.29). 
Concerning the rise of architecture of foreign aid as a determinant of aid allocation, it 
could be noted that there is a consensus in aid literature on the substantial change in 
aid structure. Rosalind Eyben et al. (2004) and J.Brian Atwood (2011) used the term 
of "the Millennium Aid Consensus" which aims to eradicate multi-dimensional 
poverty through adopting principles of ownership, coordination, and a comprehensive 
global policy to eradicate poverty.  Stijn Claessens et al. (2007) in their empirical 
study on aid policies of 22 donors and 147 recipient countries from 1970 till 2004, 
they claimed that there was a significant change in aid architecture after the end of the 
cold war; as donors directed their disbursements for development goals mainly to 
improve economic conditions through debt relief and implementing poverty reduction 
strategy. David Dollar and Victoria Levin (2006) also concluded from their empirical 
study that donors after the end of the cold war directed their aid disbursements to 
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selected countries that adopted democratic policies. Alastair Fraser and Lindsay 
Whitfield. (2009) also affirmed that new aid era is built on poverty reduction objective 
though they did not think that partnership and ownership principals are totally 
embedded in aid policies.  
This clear claim in aid literature is combined by global initiatives trying to guarantee 
aid effectiveness; the Paris Declaration in 2005 was followed by Accra Agenda for 
Action (AAA) in 2008; the World Bank released in 2009 the Legal Harmonization 
Initiative (LHI) to provide donors and recipients with legal tools to harmonize their 
policies and OECD established "The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF)" 
to monitor donor practices and their commitments to Paris principals. All those 
initiatives have set indicators to measure donors' commitments. 
Regarding aid harmonization, Paris declaration set three indicators: 1- establishing 
common arrangement in planning, managing, delivering aid; 2- simplifying 
procedures and 3- sharing information for transparency (Paul Balogun, 2005).  
Paolo de Renzio et al.(2005) measured harmonization through incentives; he 
mentioned three different contexts of incentives: 1- within aid agency; 2- among aid 
agencies 3- and between donor and partner government. Then he determined three 
levels of incentives: political; institutional; and individual incentives.  
Based on literature review, I noted that the majority of studies are empirical studies 
and tackle aid harmonization on micro level "aid agency" as authors demonstrated 
how the institutional aspects might foster or hinder aid coordination. Therefore, I 
argue that the aid policies that drown by donor governments play a major role in 
determining the degree of harmonization so I will use "state" as the unit of analysis 
not aid agency as demonstrated in the most of literature. Furthermore, I argue that 
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dynamics of aid architecture is an important incentive of donor countries to allocate 
aid. Accordingly, I will use the framework that is developed by Arne Disch (1999) 
that assesses aid coordination by four dimensions:  
• Degrees of Coordination; it measures the degree of the donor's commitment; 
which is categorized in three sub level: 
-  Consultation: this is the minimum level of coordination as donors just 
share information 
- Cooperation: this is a higher level, and usually is applied in emergency 
level as donors harmonize their policies.   
- Collaboration: the highest level of coordination when they develop a 
commitment on the field with what they agreed regarding procedures. 
• Content of Coordination: there are three types of coordination:  
- Coordination on policies, principles and priorities; here donors build 
consensus on their aid activities.  
- Coordination on procedures; donors agree on procedures of aid delivery on 
the financial scale (ex. accounting and auditing) and the political scale (ex. 
policy dialogue).  
- Coordination on practices; when donor agencies share information and 
experiences on the field of work. 
• Geographic/Regional Coordination when donor countries divide their 
activities (division of labor) within geographic areas. 
• Functional Coordination when each donor provides its aid to sector that it has 
advantage in it.  
Disch applied this framework on Norwegian aid policies; I urge this is an appropriate 
framework to measure the scope and degree of harmonization between U.K and 
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Denmark towards Ghana and Tanzania; because, it focuses on donors' policies not 
technical procedures in aid agencies.   
Hypotheses 
 The argument of the thesis is based on two hypotheses:  
- The foreign aid architecture became a main determinant of aid 
harmonization. 
- Policies and the capacity of recipient countries might affect the scope and 
degree of aid harmonization.   
Method of the Research  
A. Specify countries selection  
United Kingdom and Denmark are selected as donors, where I shall investigate their 
aid policies regarding harmonization. It's worth to mention that aid policies of both 
donors have developed differently in terms of history, institution and objectives; U.K 
unlike Denmark has historical ties with most of the countries in the African continent 
as a colonial power. Since 1997 the U.K has declared that aid policy would target 
poverty reduction (Owen Barder, 2006). However, Danish development aid 
assistances started in 1971 and motivated by being a welfare state that has a moral 
obligation towards poor countries (Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2009).   
On the other hand, Denmark achieved the international commitment of allocating 
0.7% of total GNI in 1985 (Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2009); while U.K in 2010 
claimed that it aims to meet this target by 2013 (DFID website).  
However; both of U.K and Denmark has visions regarding aid harmonization and 
both have released various initiatives and white papers in order to ensure aid 
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effectiveness. Furthermore, U.K and Denmark are among 10 top donors for Ghana 
and Tanzania in the last 5 years (OECD/DAC database, aidflows website).  
Regarding recipient countries; Tanzania and Ghana was colonized by Britain; both of 
them were ruled by national leaders (Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah, 
respectively) who were against Western intervention in the African countries and had 
a comprehensive development vision; however, their development plans failed 
because of various reasons and economic dysfunctions in the seventies which pushed 
these political regimes at that time to depend on foreign assistances. Ghana and 
Tanzania achieved significant growth after adopting structural adjustment programs; 
Benno J. Ndulu et al. (2007) stated that they were among top reformist countries from 
1995 to 2004.    
 In Tanzania and Ghana, the percentage of net Official Development Assistances 
(ODA) has been over 30 per capita since 2000 and it reached to 66% in 2009 
(OECD/DAC database, 2011) 
The relation between Tanzania and donors faced a challenge in 1990 and as a result of 
that; Tanzania restructured in 1995 its relation with donors on basis of ownership 
(Fraser, 2008). Consequently, Tanzania was the first African country that adopted 
partnership principles and I argue that this experience might affect the degree of 
harmonization. On the other side, Ghanaian government declared that it aims to be a 
middle income country and less dependent on foreign aid by 2015. (Ghana Joint 





B. Specify kinds of data:  
The study concentrates on ODA or government-to-government aid. My analysis will 
depend on gross ODA disbursements that aggregated OECD. Additionally, I will use 
global and regional initiatives on aid harmonization besides white papers released by 
donors and reports conducted by recipient countries.   
Regarding the timeframe, it will focus on the time frame determined by Paris 
Declaration starting by 2005 and targeting the year of 2010 to attain the five 
partnership commitments. Nevertheless, the study will explore aid policies of donor 
and recipient countries before 2005 to investigate the change before and after Paris 
Declaration.  
Thesis Outline  
The thesis will divide into three chapters:  
- The first chapter will illustrate the development of the notion of 
harmonization by examining international and regional declarations.  
- The second chapter will demonstrate aid policies including harmonization 
of the UK and Denmark in addition to their strategy to Africa.  
- The third chapter will discuss development strategies of Tanzania and 










AID EFFECTIVENESS: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SCOPES  
This chapter will demonstrate firstly the change in aid architecture, when the 
economic and political conditionality was the fundamental determinant of aid 
allocation then in the third millennium aid is allocated according to the principle of 
partnership. After that the chapter will explore the principle of harmonization in the 
international and regional declarations.   
1.1 Foreign aid from conditionality to partnership  
Aid architecture has undergone two major changes since the institutionalization of the 
flow of foreign aid after the Second World War. The first change occurred when 
BWIs and donor agencies applied aid conditionality through Structure Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) in the 1980s. The second change appeared in the beginning of the 
third millennium when BWIs adopted the notion of partnership in their development 
policies. Donor agencies and BWIs have justified these changes by seeking economic 
progress in poor countries and aid effectiveness but in reality these changes were a 
direct response to economic crises accompanied by changes in ideology and premises 
of donors.  
1.1.1. The first change:  Structure Adjustment Programs (SAPs)   
Before implementing Structure Adjustment Programs in the 1980s, the international 
economy was challenged by a couple of turmoil changes. First; the oil price shocks 
that took place in 1973 and 1979, where the increment of oil prices realized an 
increase in commodity prices that in turn escalated external dept of poor countries 
(Graham Harrison, 2004 & Howard Stein, 2008). Second, which is more important, is 
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the dollar devolution. This factor had a major reflect on the international economy. 
Initially, the collapse of fixed exchange rates system, companied with the excessive 
fluctuation in IMF monetary policies that aimed to maintain exchange rates and 
balance of payments of its member countries in a stable form. Moreover; this was 
followed by the upraise of interest rates that stimulated a recession in the international 
economy (Harrison, 2004 & Alastair Fraser, 2009.) 
These economic changes coincided with the change in the role of the state. As after 
the dominance of the United States of America on the international economic 
dynamics upon the dollar devolution besides Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and 
Ronald Regan (1981-1989) policies, Western countries adopted the legacy of minimal 
state intervention in development process to cope up with neoliberal policies (Roland 
Rich, 2004) and abandoned the state–led economy approach. Therefore; these 
economic and political changes endorsed neoliberalism that emphasize on 
stabilization through trade liberalization, privatization and minimal state intervention 
to achieve growth and development. 
Consequently; BWIs formulated Structure Adjustment Programs (SAPs) drawn from 
the neoliberal polices to manage dept crisis in developing countries stimulated from 
peck of oil prices and recession in donor countries. Meanwhile, the World Bank in 
particular proclaimed aid inflow would be on condition that recipients would apply 
neoliberal policies: cut public expenditures, raise interest rate, reduce trade barriers 
and tariffs, and privatization (John Pender, 2001 &Asad Ismi, 2004). Robert 
McNamara the president of World Bank Group stated in his speech in 1979 “In order 
to benefit fully from an improved trade environment the developing countries will 
need to carry out structural adjustments favoring their export sectors. I would urge 
that the international community consider sympathetically the possibility of additional 
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assistance to developing countries that undertake the needed structural adjustment for 
export promotion in line with their long-term comparative advantages” (quoted from 
Stein, 2008, p.31). Additionally; the World Bank published a report entitled 
"Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda for action" in 1981, 
which is known "Berg Report". This report pointed out that the cause of poor 
performance of African economy - though they received large amounts of aid - is the 
unsound policies in some sectors and the economy as a whole. Therefore the report 
asked the donors' agencies to transfer aid to African countries which applied real 
economic and sector reforms.   
  Additionally, political conditionality was applied in the 1990s as a respond to change 
in the international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its 
consequences. Therefore, Western countries imposed political conditionality 
(implementing democratic and human rights procedures) to counter the political 
instability in Eastern Europe and civil wars that erupted in developing countries 
(Thomas Carothers, 1999& Elling Tjonneland, 1998). 
1.1.2. The second change:  participatory approach 
Since the beginning of the third millennium, BWIs have been advocating for 
partnership and ownership as core concepts to achieve growth and development. 
Hence; they asserted that aid delivery should be dependent on these concepts. In 
reality; the notion of partnership was adopted after the failure of SAPs and the 
eruption of debt crisis in developing countries that applied neo liberal policies. 
Furthermore; the success of East Asian countries questioned the legacy of minimal 
state intervention in the development process.   
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The prescription of BWIs neither has achieved growth nor stability in developing 
countries that implemented SAPs. Asad Ismi (2004) asserted in the report 
"Impoverishing a Continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa" deadly impacts 
of SAPs in Sub Saharan Africa. He pointed out that during the 1980s GDP cut down 
by 15% and per capita income felled by 25% where people living below the poverty 
line exceeded half of Africa's population. Moreover, external debt increased by more 
than 500% as 33 of the countries that applied SAPs became heavily indebted 
countries.  Furthermore; Mexico, which adopted neoliberal polices and then it was 
considered one of the successful stories became heavily an indebted country and faced 
the threat of bankrupt (Pender, 2001). 
Beside the economic setbacks in developing countries after implementing SAPs, East 
Asian countries appeared as a miracle in achieving development (Pender, 2001). The 
state in East Asian countries played an interventionist role and public sector was an 
engine of the development process. This successful role of state to achieve growth and 
development pushed the World Bank to retreat the Western premise regarding the role 
of state. In 1997 the World Bank published its annual report under the title of "The 
State in Changing World". In this report the World Bank affirmed that state plays 
essential role in delivering goods and services and enriching market dynamics.  
The failure of foundation and policies of SAPs coincided with criticism from 
international agencies (Erik Thorbecke, 2000). In 1987, UNICEF published a study 
entitled Adjustment with Human Face. This study claimed that SAPs led to miserable 
impacts on the poor people because of the cut in public expenditures. So, it called for 
maintaining social expenditures and applying social protection policies targeting 
vulnerable people (David A. Smith, 1989.) 
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On the other hand, the Western agencies and literatures revised economic 
conditionality and BWIs deep intervention in developing countries that adopted SAPs. 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OCED claimed in their meeting 
on 3-4 May 1995 that '… Development and greater interdependence require high 
levels of domestic effort, high standards of accountability, and a strong civil society. 
Open, participatory economic and political systems are increasingly important 
factors' (OECD, 1996, p.19.) 
Also, different literatures (Paul Collier et al, 1997, Tony Killick, 2004 &Tito Cordella 
and Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, 2002) argued that aid conditionality have rationale 
objectives that could accomplish reform in developing countries. Nonetheless, the 
way of applying conditionality through SAPs led to the lack of ownership of 
recipients' countries in development planning. Paul Collier et. al concluded 'The 
attempt to buy policy changes actually exacerbates the problem of lack of ownership 
of policies on the part of the government. Without government ownership the 
persistence of reform may have insufficient credibility to induce a strong supply 
response.' (Collier et al, 1997, p. 1406.) 
To sum up, adopting aid conditionality through SAPs as a crucial strategy for poor 
countries to improve their economies failed to attain growth and stability; above all, it 
led to drastic social effects. However, ownership became the key factor to get rid of 
deadly impacts of SAPs.    
1.1.3 The notion of partnership  
Aid conditionality means using aid disbursement as incentives to recipient country to 
implement certain policies and that was applied via SAPs. Recipient countries have 
been committed to implement neoliberal policies to guarantee sustainability of aid 
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inflow. Ravi Kanbur (2000) elaborated that the relation between donor and recipient 
is "unitary entities". Accordingly; donors' agencies have intervened in formulating 
and implementing aided programs and projects while national needs and priorities of 
recipient countries have not been considered thoroughly.  
On the contrary; the notion of partnership has been developed to regulate the relation 
between donors and recipients on the base of reciprocity. Patrick Holden (2005) 
defines partnership as 'a co-operative relationship based on the principles of 
mutuality and equality'. According to this definition, foreign aid transactions from 
donors to recipients depend on mutual credibility, support and consensus on decision 
making and accountability. 
 Internationally, BWIs and donors' agencies have published several working papers, 
documents and declarations that reflect this shift in aid architecture from 
conditionality to partnership. Furthermore; they have been developing criteria and 
procedures to ensure partnership in aid allocation.  
In 1996, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which represents 
major donors, published a remarkable report entitled "Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Co-operation". Donors affirmed through that 
“Sustainable development, based on integrated strategies that incorporate key 
economic, social, environmental and political elements, must be locally owned. The 
role of external partners is to help strengthen capacities in developing partner 
countries" (p.13). Accordingly; donors' agencies claimed that aid inflow would direct 
not only to achieve economic growth but also to finance social policies. Indeed; the 
report pointed that paternalistic approaches would be omitted because recipients' 
countries would determine their development strategies. Additionally; the report 
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affirmed that donors would support private sector and civil society beside government 
as all are partners in development.   Furthermore; DAC members suggested indicators 
to ensure the commitment of developing countries.  
Subsequently, donors declared their perspective about the new aid architecture; the 
World Bank constructed the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) in 1999 
which promotes the principles of ownership, cooperation among development 
stakeholders and transparency on development outcomes with adopting holistic long 
term strategy to eradicate poverty and achieve development (World Bank website, 
n.d.) 
 In 2002, the international conference on financing development was held in 
Monterrey city in Mexico to discuss the challenges of financing development. States 
and governments reached a consensus "Monterrey Consensus" with regard to the 
mechanisms of mobilization of both domestic and international resources for 
development as well as the strategies to enhance monetary and trading system. The 
Monterrey Consensus is considered one of the remarkable international agreement 
advocating for partnership. Regarding international financial and technical 
cooperation, it is stated that 'Effective partnerships among donors and recipients are 
based on the recognition of national leadership and ownership of development plans 
and, within that framework, sound policies and good governance at all levels are 
necessary to ensure ODA [Official Development Assistance] effectiveness.' (United 
Nations, 2003,p.14.) 
 
With applying partnership; BWIs created in 1999 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) as a new approach through it aid will be channeled. The PRSP should be:  
country – driven, result – oriented, comprehensive, partnership – oriented, and long -
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term strategy. And PRSPs became the reference for negotiations between donors' 
agencies and recipients' countries (IMF, 2012.). Further the principle of partnership 
was embedded in the MDGs. The 8th goal tackling global partnership in a broaden 
manner as it includes different aspects of partnership between the ‘rich’ countries and 
the ‘poor’ countries. These aspects are ODA disbarments, debt relief, free trade 
regulations and new technology transformation. Though this goal aims to increase the 
opportunity of the poor countries to integrate in the international economic system, it 
does not reshape the relation between the poor countries and BWIs; furthermore, it 
tackles these aspects in a separate way for instance it does not link between endorsing 
free trade regulations and the effectiveness of technology transfer. On the other side, 
it does not differentiate between the needs of the poor countries and small and locked 
countries. Regarding ODA disbursements, it focuses on ODA volume and abandons 
the regulations to manage this volume.    
1.2. International Declarations  
Following these series of international conferences, donors became more focused on 
how to operationalize the agreed principles; therefore, specific international 
statements that endorse aid effectiveness per se have been declared.  
1.2.1. Rome Declaration on Harmonization 
In February 2003, Rome Declaration on Harmonization was signed by 28 recipient 
countries and 40 bilateral and multilateral donors. The declaration asserts that in order 
to attain MDGs with stimulating economic growth in developing countries, donors 
have to coordinate their disbursements and aid delivery process has to be based on 
country level as development projects and programs are designed according to 
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recipient's needs and priorities. Accordingly, donors have to underpin recipients' 
capabilities in drawing and implementing development policies. To obtain these 
objectives, the declaration set commitments on donor and recipient countries (OECD, 
2003.) 
What is more eminent in Rome Declaration is the principle of harmonization which is 
articulated in this international statement while other declarations on aid effectiveness 
tackle harmonization within other principles as will be explained later.  
The declaration illustrates the reasons behind the need of aid coordination. From 
donor's side, the high transaction costs represented in the number of missions and the 
number of collected reviews and reports in addition to the contradiction among 
adopting project cycles. From recipient's side, poor financial and administrative 
capabilities and the contradiction of procedures required from each donor agency 
(OECD, 2003.) 
Donor countries that signed the declaration committed to synchronize their policies 
and procedures through promoting delegated cooperation on country level, creating 
incentives for staff in the field to work in harmonized way, affording technical 
assistance upon recipient's demands and directing aid to sector or budget rather than 
projects (OECD, 2003.) 
The commitment on recipient countries is to reform their financial and administrative 
systems to fit with donors' systems because donors apply 'international standards'. Six 
African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Niger, Senegal and Zambia) are 
selected to be the first countries adopt this commitment (OECD, 2003.) 
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According to the commitments of Rome Deceleration, it is appeared that donors 
determined indecisively the degree of harmonization; it is stated in the declaration 'we 
will explore how such collaboration could help to ensure that new or revised policies 
are appropriately harmonised or “harmonisable” with those of the partner countries 
and donor institutions' (OECD, 2003, p.1). Further, the Declaration affirms that the 
next step toward aid harmonization should be taken by the recipient countries as the 
argument is that the recipient country has to lead donors to harmonize their 
implemented activities.   
1.2.2 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness  
In 2005, a significant step was taken and it reflected obviously the shift in the aid 
architecture from conditionality to partnership; it was "Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness" which became a procedural framework to apply partnership notion 
between donors and recipients (OECD, 2005). The declaration set five "Partnership 
Commitments":  
1- Ownership:   Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their 
development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions 
2- Alignment: Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures 
3- Harmonization: Donors’ actions are more harmonized, transparent and 
collectively effective 
4- Managing for Result: Managing resources and improving decision-making for 
results 




The declaration indicates to the challenges of aid effectiveness that include poor 
administrative capabilities of recipient governments and high rates of corruption; poor 
quality of national development policies; lack of predictability of aid disbursements; 
absence of organizational incentives for bureaucrats in recipient countries and in 
donor agencies and duplication and less coordination between specialized aid 
programs such as HIV/AID programs which are adopted by various donors (OECD, 
2005.) 
The Paris Declaration is a progressive international statement compared to Rome 
Declaration because it shares the causes of aid ineffectiveness and the responsibilities 
between donors and recipients and that apparently employs in the last commitment 
'mutual accountability' as both donors and recipient countries are responsible for  the 
results of applied development policies. Further, the sub commitments were 
categorized under donor commitments; partner countries 'recipient' commitments and 
joint commitments.  
 Importantly, the declaration sets twelve indicators to measure the progress in each 
commitment and the year of 2010 is determined to be the target line to meet the five 
commitments.  
The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness [WP-EFF] was founded under the OECD. It 
includes OECD/DAC members, partner countries and multilateral institutions. The 
main goal of the Working Party is to monitor the performance of donor and recipient 
countries in achieving the commitments of aid effectiveness (OECD website, n.d.) 
Regarding the third principle 'harmonization', the declaration identifies five 
dimensions of harmonization and under each dimension the commitments of donors 
and recipients are determined (OECD, 2005), they are: 
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1- Common arrangements and simplified procedures; donors are committed to 
adopt joint financial and project cycles and to review their reporting systems 
to simplify them. Further, donors have to discuss how to employ joint mission 
in the field and to share information and practices among each others.   
2- Complementarily and more effective division of labor; in this dimension 
donors are committed to synchronize their producers; additionally, they are 
advised to delegate their financial and administrative leadership to the donor 
that has 'a comparative advantage' in the implemented program or project. 
Whilst the recipient country has to prepare a map of the capabilities of each 
donor and the best sector or program the donor is able to assist.     
3- Incentives for collaborative behavior; bureaucrats in recipient countries and in 
donor agencies have to get specialized trainings and to be stimulated to 
underpin harmonized activities in their field functions.   
4- Delivering effective aid in fragile states; in the case of fragile states where 
government institutions and state capacity to deliver public services are weak, 
harmonization among donor agencies are crucial to ease the complexity of 
financial and administrative burden on the fragile government. Therefore, 
donors are advised to use joint strategies and joint offices; on the other side, 
they are encouraged to modify the aid modalities according to the government 
conditions. While the fragile state has to reform its institutions and to develop 
national development strategy reflects its needs and priorities with promoting 
societal participation. Based on the pursuit of the fragile state in building the 
institutions and formulating the national development strategy, donors will be 
committed to the development priorities and will afford consultation on 
development planning.   
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5- Promoting a harmonised approach to the environmental assessments; donors 
and recipient countries are committed jointly to share techniques and 
information of environmental impact assessment (EIA). According to the 
progress achieved in the environment field, harmonization will be extended to 
other cross cutting aspects such as gender equality.     
Among the twelve indicators, two indicators are set to measure the performance of 
donors not recipient countries toward harmonization, these indicators are:  
1- Use of common arrangements or procedures: donor has to allocate 66% of its 
aid flows to programs not projects by 2010.   
2-  Encourage shared analysis: donors have to arrange 40% of its mission to be 
joint missions and 66% of reviews and documents about the conditions of the 
recipient country have to be prepared jointly.  
Indeed, the principle of harmonization is embedded in the other four principles; in the 
first principle ownership, the recipient country is supposed to take the lead of 
coordination among national actors in preparing the development strategy and among 
donors. In the principle of alignment, donors are advised to coordinate the style of aid 
allocation if the recipient procurement system is inadequate. Regarding the principle 
of managing for results, donors are supposed to harmonize their monitoring and 
evaluation systems while in the mutual accountability, donors have to share 
information on their aid flows (OECD, 2005.) 
It is appeared that the scope of harmonization as tackled in Paris declaration has been 
broadened to include cases of fragile states and specific development themes such as 
environment. Though the declaration determines a set of indicators to guarantee the 
commitments of donor and recipient countries,  the language of indicators are flexible 
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for example; in the dimension of delegation, the commitment is stated with using the 
phrase of 'where appropriate'; further, the same language is used in defining the 
methodology of measuring the indicators,  it indicates that 'In measuring individual 
donor performance, the indicators should be applied with flexibility in the recognition 
that donors have different institutional mandates.' (OECD, 2005, P.13.)  
Two monitoring surveys were conducted in 2006 and 2008 to assess the performance 
of donors and recipient countries toward the 12 indicators stated in Paris declaration. 
The surveys shows that notable progress has achieved in the aspects of using of untied 
aid though tied aid concentrates in technical and food aid and increasing the allocation 
of disbursements to the national budget and that action has been noted in the health 
sector. Nonetheless, conditionality has not been diminished. On the other side, some 
recipient countries have retained its ownership for development planning and 
implementation and have pushed donor agencies to be aligned toward national 
development needs and priorities (OECD 2006; 2008a.) 
The performance regarding the two indicators on harmonization shows that donors' 
commitment to use program - based approaches in delivering aid is modest as 46% of 
aid inflows has allocated to programs in 2007 while the target is 66% by 2010. In the 
second indicator, the survey finds that only 20% of missions are joint missions while 
the target is 40% by 2010 and 43% of joint reviews and documents have been 
prepared and the target is 66% (OECD, 2008a.)   
According to the quite progress toward the commitments of harmonization, the 
surveys identify the challenges that have encumbered the progress. From donor 
perspectives, the challenges are: the poor capability (time and resources) of staff in 
the field mission to promote harmonized activities with other missions and the need to 
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conceive the achievements of aid agency to the public opinion and political actors. 
While some recipient countries have not employed the principle of ownership and 
they have designed development plans without considering the comparative 
advantage of each donor (OECD, 2008a.) 
Regardless of the findings of the monitoring surveys, some requirements became 
visible through implementations. These requirements include the role of political 
leadership in both donor and recipient countries to convince citizens, the government 
bureaucrats; parliamentarians and civil society with the essence of partnership and the 
utilities of adopting Paris principles (OECD, 2008a.)  
1.2.3 Accra Agenda  
To overcome the impediments that emerged after Paris Declaration, donor and 
recipient countries held the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
September 2008 in Accra, Ghana to reaffirm on the commitments of Paris Declaration 
that have been vigorously challenged by severe global economic crises essentially the 
boom of food and fuel prices and the climate change and the impacts of such global 
crises on attaining MDGs. The meeting resulted in Accra Agenda on Aid 
Effectiveness. The agenda describes the progress toward Paris commitments 'too slow' 
progress; therefore, it revisits the key principles; ownership and partnership and 
explores how to conceive development achievements without abandoning aid 
effectiveness' commitments (OECD, 2008b.)        
Concerning the principle of country ownership; the Accra Agenda illustrates how the 
recipient country could develop its national strategy with the inclusion of all national 
stakeholders such as parliamentarians, local governments, private sector, civil society 
and media in formulating the national development strategy. The agenda indicates in 
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this respect that if the capabilities of the recipient government impede to establish 
such national dialogue, the government has to determine accurately the areas of 
weakness in its institutions and accordingly donors are supposed to afford technical 
assistances to improve the performance of institutions. On the other side; donors are 
committed to use country system in managing aid disbursements. The Agenda also 
illustrates that if the donor country has used its financial system or created parallel 
institutions to avoid weak institutions; in that case the donor has to justify this 
behavior and to assist recipient country to reform its institutions and regulation as 
well (OECD, 2008b.)  
In revisiting the principle of partnership, ‘Inclusive partnership’ is used for the first 
time. It means that new comers to aid architecture mainly developing countries, 
private enterprises and civil society organizations have to be committed to this 
principles that constitutes the essence of aid effectiveness.  Indeed, the agenda refers 
apparently to the benefits of South - South cooperation and the crucial role of 
multilateral organizations (OECD, 2008b.) 
Moreover, the Agenda advises to reduce the duplication and to utilize the existing 
organizations rather than establishing new ones. In this regard the agenda indicates to 
the progress in using untied aid and it promotes recipient countries to use products 
manufactured by national or regional enterprises in implemented projects (OECD, 
2008b.) 
The Agenda discusses the feasibility of development projects; it explains that to 
persuade citizens in recipient countries and taxpayers in donor countries with the 
impact of development aid, transparency and regular reviews have to be embedded in 
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the process of implementing development projects. In this regard, mutual assessment 
is important to reach feasible deliverables (OECD, 2008b.) 
Harmonization has no specific room in Accra agenda though the monitoring surveys 
show poor progress in the indicators of harmonization. However, the Agenda 
reaffirms on allocating aid disbursements to programs and determines the role of 
recipient countries and donors to apply the division of labor; the recipient country has 
to introduce the role of each donor based on national priorities and the donor on the 
other side has to disseminate its comparative advantages and best practices to 
facilitate division of labor. Accordingly, Accra agenda has not added evident 
dimension on the principle of harmonization.  
1.2.4 The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation  
With reaching the target year 2010, a monitoring survey was conducted with 
participation of large number of recipient and donor countries compared to previous 
surveys. The survey shows that the performance of recipient countries in general have 
been better than donors and the coordination among donors in technical aid to 
improve the capability of recipient government has been provided according to supply 
driven approach. While quite progress has been achieved in using country financial 
and administrative systems indeed the government to government aid has not been the 
mainstream of aid modality (OECD, 2011a.) 
Regarding harmonization, using common procedures and documents has not been the 
mainstream; further, sharing the budget planning with the recipient countries has not 





The Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was held in 2011 in Busan in 
South Korea to reassess the performance of donors and recipients countries. This 
forum introduces a substantial change in the aid architecture on three aspects. The 
first aspect is the shift from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness; the second 
aspect is the expansion of the notion of partnership on the international and national 
levels and the third aspect is the formulation of a structure to monitor the performance 
of actors.  
Regarding the first aspect, the transformation from aid effectiveness to development 
effectiveness is driven by the need to attain the MDGs in 2015 in addition to foster the 
economic growth of poor countries to sustain development. For that reason, job 
creation, women rights, environment and other development themes are embedded in 
the forum's discourse and the development policy coherence became a significant 
term. In this respect, official development aid has been tackled as one resource that 
complements other development resources such as investment and trade (BUSAN 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 2011). Through this change, the 
global debate has returned back to square one to the Monterrey consensus in 2000 
when development aid was discussed within other resources.   
The second change is related to the notion of partnership; the new scope of 
partnership is defined as ' the Partnership would adopt a multi-track approach, where 
on the one hand, commitments agreed in Paris and Accra would continue to be 
implemented and relevant parties would be held accountable for implementing the 
unfinished aid effectiveness agenda, and on the other hand, the broad Partnership 
would jointly implement commitments agreed in Busan' (WP-EFF, 2011, p. 6.). In 
addition to the commitment to attain partnership facets as identified in the indicators 
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of Paris declaration, the notion practically is broaden to include new donors besides 
the traditional donors represented in DAC committee. Those donors are developing 
countries that have achieved notable development through adopting their development 
prescript and China, India, Brazil are the main new donors.  Furthermore, the new 
global partnership claims the role of South – South cooperation in encountering 
economic growth and development. Apparently, the new orientation of partnership is 
built on 'triangulation cooperation' as various resources of funding are welcomed to 
participate in the new aid architecture (BUSAN Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation, 2011.) 
On national level, 'country level' instead of ' government' became the core unit in 
handling the principle of ownership. Societal participation and private sectors have to 
be rigorously integrated in formulating and implementing the national development 
strategies. In view of that, the development priorities and other action plans about the 
role of donors that prepared by the recipient government have to be discussed first 
with all economic and social actors so that the implementation of national 
development strategies could be easier because of the consensus on them (BUSAN 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 2011.).    
The third change is about the structure of the 'Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (GPEDC)'.  This change could be considered a progressive 
step because the commitments of Paris Declaration are monitored in casual way by 
the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness under the OECD. The Working Party's main 
task is to conduct surveys to evaluate the performance and not all donor and recipient 
countries have participated in those surveys. Therefore creating well identified 
structure is a step forward to pledge the agreed principles. The main functions of the 
new structure are: 1) endorsing political commitment to effective development 
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cooperation; 2) regulating the monitoring and evaluation processes; 3) sharing 
knowledge and information among actors and 4) underpinning the commitment of 
national stakeholders to Busan principles (WP- EFF, 2012a.)  
Though the new structure has not been set yet, ten donor and recipient countries and 
organizations were assigned to propose the scope and functions of the new structure, 
African countries have been represented in this group by Rwanda and the South 
African besides the African Union.  The proposed structure consists of three bodies: 
the Council will represent the ministers of countries that adopted Busan Outcome 
Document and the civil society organizations will be able to participate in the 
council's meetings. The council will provide the political promise to the global 
partnership and it will discuss the raising issues on development cooperation. The 
second body is the Steering Committee that aims to spread the policies and needs of 
partnership in the international fora such as G20, UN and Rio+20 and to ensure the 
implementation of agreed principles on the country level. Various forms of 
membership are proposed; the narrow formulation will include representatives of 
traditional donors; new donors and recipient countries while the broad formulation 
will make the membership open for donor and recipient countries in addition to 
representatives from private sectors; parliamentarians and civil society organizations. 
The Secretariat will be formed form OECD/DAC and UNDP due to their experiences 
in collecting, disseminating data on the performance and the best practices of 
development partners (Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 
2012.) 
One of proposed ideas regarding the structure of the new global Partnership is Block 
that will work as a pressure group. It includes various actors who are interested in a 
certain issue in development cooperation. During meetings, different blocks were 
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formed such as a block on the fragile state, block on South - South cooperation and a 
block on public private cooperation. There is a consensus in Bsuan on not to 
institutionalize the emerging blocks so that they could handle their issues easier (WP- 
EFF, 2012b.)   
Concerning the principle of harmonization, it has not had a distinct dimension in 
Busan forum; however, there has been a conformation on the magnitude of sharing 
updated and comprehensive information about the type of funds. Furthermore, donors 
are committed to disseminate their expected aid disbursements for 3 or 5 years in 
advance so that recipient countries or organizations can plan their budget efficiently; 
additionally, donors are committed to increase their joint missions; delegate their 
financial or administrative authorities to the appropriate donor and to decrease the 
number of parallel units and to use the global units to manage their disbursements 
(BUSAN Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 201.)   
UNDP, EU, Overseas Development Institute, Germany, Uganda and Honduras 
formed 'Busan Building Block on Managing Diversity and Reducing Fragmentation'. 
They aim to enhance harmonization through limiting fragmentation and proliferation 
and to assist recipient countries to open other channels of development funds. The 
members in the block agreed that there are different approaches and tools to reduce 
fragmentation and to ensure ownership such as joint programming, division of labor, 
and delegated cooperation. On the other side, they advised that recipient countries 
have to develop their systems in collecting data to be more accurate in order to help 
donor countries in planning their harmonized actions. Furthermore, they claimed that 
the recipient country has the right to choose its donors (The Fourth High-Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness, 2011).     
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This part discusses the principle of harmonization as tackled in the international level. 
It shows how this principle has been the core of the first international declaration on 
aid effectiveness Rome Declaration and then in Paris declaration the indicators were 
developed to assess the performance of donors. While the Accra agenda and The New 
Global Partnership that will replace Paris Declaration have not emphasized on the 
principle and indicates to its dimensions when discussing the notions of ownership 
and partnership.  What more important in Paris Declaration is the scope of 
harmonization was broaden to include financial, bureaucratic and policy 
harmonization.   
1.3. Regional Policies on Aid Harmonization  
This part will discuss the views of the regional organizations on aid effectiveness and 
the principle of harmonization in particular. It will differentiate between the 
perspective of donor organization represented in the EU, where the U.K and Denmark 
have its membership, and the AU's perspective that represents Ghana and Tanzania.    
1.3.1. The EU Policies  
The EU endorsed in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 the scope of development 
cooperation. It is built on three main principles: Coordination, Complementarity and 
Coherence (3Cs). Coordination indicates to the cooperation among member states to 
avoid high transaction costs; while the principle of complementarity aims to limit 
duplication among European community and member states in allocating 
development aid and coherence aims to employ consistency of implemented activities 
in the field or in the adopted policy (Paul Hoebink, 2004.) 
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In 2006 a leading declaration "The European Consensus on Development" is adopted. 
This declaration is considered the European manifesto on aid effectiveness. The 
Development cooperation in the Consensus is defined as 'a shared competence 
between the European Community and the Member States.  Community  policy  in  
the  sphere  of  development  cooperation  shall  be  complementary  to the  policies  
pursued  by  the  Member  States' (European Parliament, Council and Commission, 
2006, p. 1). Based on this definition of development cooperation, it is a narrow 
definition as it limits cooperation between the European community that includes the 
Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament and the member 
states. Then according to the comparative advantage of each member state and the 
European community, EU manages its aid disbursements to the outside developing 
countries.  
The consensus identified four sets of principles that guide the allocation of European 
aid. The first group of principles is about endorsing ownership and partnership in 
addition to alignment to national development strategies. Despite the alignment to 
national priorities, the European community and member states are committed to 
underpin the role of civil society organizations in formulating and implementing 
national development policies; additionally, there is an emphasis on women 
participation in national policies. Politically, the European Community is committed 
to intervene in the fragile states and to assist them in building the capacity of weak 
governments. Indeed, the consensus anchors the importance of political dialogue 
among member states and the community in order to share their perspectives and 
practices on development issues such as human rights and illegal migration. 
(European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006.)  
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The second set of principles 'Delivering more and better aid' reaffirms the 
commitment to increase the aid flows of member states to constitute 0.7% of GNI by 
2015. Meeting this commitment is coincided with the performance of recipient 
countries and the degree of transparency in managing the received aid. Harmonization 
has been underpinned in this set of principle as it claims the commitment to the 
international principles on aid effectiveness.  According to the consensus, different 
aid modalities (project aid; sector or general budget support and humanitarian aid) are 
complementary; however, it indicates that the better practice is sector or general 
budget support. Concerning the managing of aid predictability and decreasing untied 
aid, European members and community are guided by OECD recommendations. 
Furthermore, the European community is committed to encourage its members to 
allocate their aid via joint multiannual programming and joint missions and to share 
the analysis documents. What is important, the European community is committed to 
direct 50% of its aid to the recipient government using its financial and administrative 
systems and to decrease the uncoordinated missions by 50%. Finally the consensus 
affirms that the recipient country genuinely has to lead donor coordination (European 
Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006.) 
The third set of principles 'Policy Coherence for development (PCD)' focuses on the 
importance of complementing among development trends and resources. European 
community and members have to coordinate their trade, investment, migration and 
agriculture policies (European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006.) 
The last set of principles is about facing global challenges that reflect in severe 
dimensions of poverty. The consensus advocates concentrating aid disbursements in 
areas of poverty without abandoning the principles of ownership and alignment 
(European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006.) 
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To operationalize the 3Cs and the Development Consensus, EU endorsed in 2007 the 
Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labor in Development Policy. 
This code sets guidelines for member states to ensure aid effectiveness in terms of 
principles of Paris Declaration (Council of the European Union, 2007). It includes:  
- Concentrate on a limited number of sectors in-country to reduce 
transaction costs and channel aid to budget support. 
- Redeployment for other in-country activities. 
- Lead donor arrangement. 
- Delegated cooperation. 
- Ensure an adequate donor support. 
- Replicate practices at regional level. 
- Establish priority countries. 
- Analyze and expand areas of strength. 
- Pursue progress on other dimensions of complementarity 
Apparently, this code includes various aspects that limited aid fragmentation by 
applying delegation and lead donor mechanism; recipient selectivity and sector and 
budget support.    
Furthermore; the EU recommends providing aid by preparing multiannual 
programming that responds better to recipients' development priorities and attains 
complementary policies. In addition, it adopted the Joint Assistance Strategies and 
EU-dialogue as mechanisms to coordinate areas of activity and avoiding duplication 
(Council of the European Union, 2007). In 2010, the EU adopted action plan that 
focuses more on the aspects of aid coordination; it determines five priorities to 
enhance effectiveness: use of country systems including capacity building, division of 
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labor, untied aid, changed conditionality and predictability and transparency (The 3Cs 
initiative website.) 
The EU has mainly articulated the principle of harmonization within the goal of 
development coordination not under the goal of aid effectiveness then it has 
developed various guides and tools to employ this principle in the field.   
1.3.2. The African policies  
Since the beginning of the third millennium, African countries represented in the AU 
and NEPAD have tackled aid effectiveness through a series of joint meetings with 
donor countries and organizations. In 2003, the African Partnership Forum was 
founded with the aim of promoting dialogue between NEPAD and G8. The forum 
holds two meetings in year; the first meeting in the spring headed by a country of G8 
to discuss polices and priorities of African countries; the second meeting in the 
autumn headed by an African country and to monitor and evaluate the 
implementations (African Partnership Forum website). In 2010, The Tunis Consensus 
was declared to represent the African view toward aid effectiveness, African countries 
and institutions advocate for development effectiveness rather than focusing on aid. 
This view is driven by the attainment of independence. Therefore, the consensus 
invokes the pivotal role of state in development and magnetizing the alternative 
resources to finance development. The consensus determined six areas to endorse 
development effectiveness, they are stated as following:   
1- Building a capable state to be able to implement development strategies.  
2- Developing democratic accountability to share responsibilities between the 
government and development stakeholders.  
47 
 
3- Promoting South-South cooperation to create alternative resources for 
development and growth and to foster continental integration.   
4- Thinking and acting regionally to allocate development aid to transboundary 
projects to accelerate regional integration.     
5- Embracing new development partners to benefit from development 
experiences of the other developing countries such as India, Brazil and China 
and this potential cooperation will built on transparency and mutual benefits.  
6- Outgrowing aid dependence to increase local resources through reform tax 
systems and search for alternatives to finance development plans.   
According to the Tunis Consensus, African countries reiterate aid independency 
through improving state capacity so that it can mobilize other revenues internally and 
externally to implement the development plans. Additionally, African countries 
sought to underpin the regional integration and the South - South cooperation; in this 
regard, the consensus criticizes Paris Declaration because it focuses on the 
effectiveness of bilateral aid and omits aid disbursements to regional investments and 
projects. As well, the consensus criticizes the degree of commitment of donor 
agencies to employ country financial and administrative systems as donor agencies 
put conditions to use national system and ask recipient country to apply international 
standards and to abandon the national dynamics. (The Tunis Consensus, 2010.) 
Following up the consensus, in 2010, NEPAD and African Union established the 
'Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness (APDev)' with partnership of UNDP, 
WB, GIZ, AfDB, and The Institute for Security of Studies (ISS).  It is a website for 
sharing information, learned lessons and best practices in the fields of designing 
development policies and employing principles of ownership and regional integration 




Concerning the new global partnership, African countries with other recipient 
countries stated a position paper representing  Partner  Countries’  visions  and  
priorities  for  discussion  at  the  High  Level  Forum  4  (HLF4)  in  Busan before 
holding the summit in 2011. The position paper elaborates the impediments of 
development effectiveness and their views on the new architecture (OECD, 2011a.) 
In the meeting of the 'Africa Platform for Development effectiveness' that was held 
after Busan in 2012 in Addis Ababa, African countries asserts on the alignment of 
donor countries to national priorities; combating the illegal disbursements to Africa in 
addition to meet the international commitment of increasing aid to 0.7% of GNI 
(APDev, 2012). Regarding the establishment of new architecture based on 
development effectiveness, they affirm on the need to integrate Africa in the global 
arrangements such as G20 and in the executive level in the governmental institutions 
WB and UN in particular (African Union and NEPAD, 2011.)  
The perspective of African countries on the notion of partnership, they affirm on the 
'transformative partnership' where the South - South cooperation and private sector 
participation complement the traditional pattern of cooperation between the north and 
the south. Furthermore, they assert that the new partnership has to complement the 
African vision not to create new strategy. The African vision is built on decreasing aid 
dependency and supporting capacity building in order to mobilize domestic resources. 
Indeed, they retain the new architecture has to be guided by national demands and 
needs and to consider coherence among development policies (African Union and 
NEPAD, 2011.)  
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After the 18th summit of African Union in 2012; they established two arrangements in 
order to deploy Africa's needs and priorities in the new architecture: the Ministerial 
Working Group to drive Africa’s interests in the post- Busan process and the Africa 
Post-Busan Technical Working Group (African Partnership Forum website.) 
It is appeared that the focal point of African perception is development effectiveness 
which is compatible with the new architecture. Aid effectiveness has been handled 
within the broad vision on development cooperation. More important, aid 

















DONORS’ AID POLICIES 
This chapter will illustrate U.K and Denmark policies toward Africa since the new 
millennium when attaining economic and social development became an essential 
factor in determining the goals of foreign policies. The chapter will examine the 
foreign policy toward the African continent then aid policies through exploring the 
white papers and arrangements that manage development aid disbursements to verify 
to what extent both U.K and Denmark endorse aid harmonization.  
2.1 The United Kingdom  
2.1.1 Foreign policy toward Africa 
The British foreign policy toward Africa in the new millennium has been dominated 
by the Labour Party that formed the government in 1997, after 17 years in the seat of 
opposition, and it handed the power to the Conservative Party in 2010.   
The Third Way ideology formulated the Labour Party's policies that compiles 
between economic liberal policies and social justice principles. This ideology has 
been translated into foreign policy goals. Paul Kelemen (2007) explained historically 
the Labour Party's policy toward Africa which had been covered by social principles. 
The Labour Party underlined the role of African peasants in the development of local 
communities with countering the role of capitalist merchants in the West Africa in 
particular. Notwithstanding, the Party promoted the movement of modernization in 
Africa through expanding the British enterprises and privatization the plantations in 
African so peasants became paid labor in African lands. The Party's policies in 
modernizing Africa through capitalist policies were elaborated by two reasons; to 
impede African migration to Britain through creating opportunities for African labors 
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and to increase the productivity of lands by local development. In spite of these 
economic liberal policies, the Labour Party played the role of the defender of African 
labor rights as it worked to empower the cooperatives and trade unions because these 
arrangements could balance between the applied capitalist policies and social 
premises. After the Second World War, the policy of the Labour Party that was based 
on ‘socialisation and self-government’ alongside 'development' participated in 
acquiring independence later. For example, the Movement for Colonial Freedom 
(MCF) that emerged in 1954 came out form the Labour Party and in 1956 the Party 
suggested to hand over the power to the African territories where the white settlers 
inhibited so they could assist Africans in building the state.  
The adopted policy that combines liberal economy and socialist goals has identified 
the Party's foreign policy with the 'morale foreign policy'. Rita Abrahmsen and Paul 
Williams (2001) demonstrate how the ideology of the 'Third Way' has been reflected 
in the British foreign policy toward Africa as peace, prosperity and democracy have 
been declared the three imperatives that guide the British policy in Africa. Regarding 
preventing conflicts and building the peace, the UK sent troops to Sierra Leon in 2000 
in order to end the conflict. While to attain prosperity for African countries, U.K has 
endorsed poverty reduction through enhancing economic growth via free and fair 
trade; erasing debt and disbursing development aid. Promoting good governance is the 
way to consolidate democracy.    
The success of British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 alongside the prominent 
role of development aid in reducing poverty comparing to other Western donors the 
USA in particular have accelerated Africa in the British foreign policy domains. 
Additionally, the public opposition to the participation in the war against Iraq in 2003 
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has embarked Africa in Tony Blair's foreign policy to retain his achievements in the 
field of foreign policy (Tom Porteous, 2005.)  
Consequently, Africa became the focus of Blair's foreign policy in the second term 
started in 2001. In 2004, Tony Blair invited the leaders of G8 to an international 
summit on Africa. From this summit, the Commission on Africa Development was 
formed and it disseminated the report entitled 'Our Common Interest'. The rationale of 
the summit was to renew the international commitments to provide African countries 
with technical and financial assistances to attain Africa progress. The summit 
admitted that African countries have been struggled to reduce poverty and they need 
'big Push' from donors. Accordingly, the summit proposed a 'comprehensive package 
for Africa' that emphasizes on building the capacity of state to be capable of 
delivering services; preventing internal violence and promoting security; and 
attracting investments and various enterprises to prosper economic growth (Our 
Common Interest, 2005.) 
The summit concluded with a promise of increasing ODA to Africa by US$25 billion 
per year for five years and additional US$25 billion a year to be implemented by 
2015. The conditions of increasing aid are feasible impacts and good governance and 
from donor side; harmonization, ownership, untied aid, predictability and 
accountability have to be embedded in their aid policies (Our Common Interest, 
2005.) 
Apparently, the summit drew good image for Britain in the international arena as the 
leader of development and the poor; Tony Blair stated ‘Eliminating world poverty is 
in Britain’s interests – and is one of the greatest moral challenges we face.’(DIFD, 
2006, P. 4.) 
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Despite the role that Tony Blair tried to illustrate, different reasons affected 
negatively on this role. The Military intervention in Africa, the U.K has been accused 
of having illegal arm trade with Sierra Leon and DRC; indeed, its intervention in 
Sierra Leon in 2000 was against the UN embargo and the number of British soldiers 
in the UN peace troops in Africa is very small and outside the fieldwork. 
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2001). On the other side, the rationale of the African 
commission has drawbacks; Paul D.Williams (2005) argues that the commission and 
the released report advocates for neo liberal economic policies and that contradicts 
with the ideology of the Labour Party. Despite that, the report has not got the support 
from other G8 countries; for example, the USA and Japan argue that the 
recommendations of the report could not be adopted because they are not appropriated 
with their budget and financial modalities; while Germany and Italy claimed that they 
have not been willing to send more disbursements to Africa. On the contrary, France 
and Canada stated that their disbursements to Africa actually reached the proposed 
amount and they covered the development fields.  Furthermore, the commission has 
tackled the G8 trade policies toward African countries; they have not promised to 
decrease trade barriers on agriculture products in particular. In addition, the call for 
debt relief is conditioned on adopting economic reforms. The U.K is sending its 
assistances to Uganda, Zimbabwe and corrupted regimes which contradicts with the 
principles of good governance. Williams added that the report has not tackled 
explicitly the relation among terrorism; poverty and undemocratic regimes in some of 
African countries.   
Incidents have appeared the paradox in the Labour Party's policies toward Africa and 
how such paradox between its ethical values for assisting poor countries and   
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attainment the national interests has deteriorated its image in the international arena 
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2001; Chris Allen, 1998.) 
On the contrary, the Conservative Party's polices toward Africa, which formed the 
government in 2010, has determined its priorities explicitly, Henry Bellingham, the 
Minister for Africa in Foreign and Commonwealth Office delivered a speech in 
December 16, 2010 under the title of 'UK and Africa: Delivering Prosperity 
Together';  where he identifies three areas of U.K missions in Africa:    
1- Increasing the British enterprises and investments in Africa with focusing on 
deepening trade relations with economic hubs in the continent such as South 
Africa and Senegal. However, in this regard, the minister affirms that 
promoting economic relations with African regimes does not mean omitting 
human rights records and inequality; therefore, the cooperate social 
responsibility (CSR) of British enterprises are supposed to assist in  providing 
social services to endorse growth with equity.   
2- Flourishing trade relations among African countries through supporting 
African Union and economic regional organizations.     
3- Promoting African integration in the global economy. Therefore, Britain will 
persuade European countries and G8 to open their markets for Africa's 
products; on the other side, Britain will facilitate for African Diaspora to start 
their business in U.K.  
These declared objectives are compatible with general British objectives that focus on 
building economic relations with the rising economies and on protecting economic 
interests. More important, these objectives are coincided with the principles of the 
Conservatives Party. Historically, the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in the eve of 
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colonies independence in 1960 delivered the speech 'Wind of the Change' in Cape 
Town; he tried to convince the new independent states to join the west part through 
the commonwealth where the state sovereignty is respected and military and 
administrative support are available; additionally, he emphasized on economic 
interdependence between the new independent states. 
According to policies of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, Africa has 
economic priority in the British foreign policy. For the Conservative Party, 
strengthening the economic relations is the clear target; while  the Labour Party 
covers this interest with political objectives such as promoting good governance and 
protecting democracies.  
2.1.2 The British Aid Policy  
This part demonstrates the institutional attributes of British foreign aid and its 
commitments to aid effectiveness including the principle of harmonization.  
The Colonial Development Act (1929) determined the fields of the allocation of 
technical assistances; machines for agriculture sector to increase the productivity of 
farms and infrastructure projects mainly electricity, irrigation systems besides internal 
transportation and building ports to transfer products to Britain.    
By the end of the Second World War in 1945, the U.K declared the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act. According to this act, British assistances to the 
colonies would channel to education sector besides promoting 'welfare' of colonies 
(Kelemen, 2007). During the cold war, foreign aid was a crucial tool, in this regard, 
the Labour Party in 1957 suggested establishing 'International Development 
Authority' which the Western powers could channel their aid to Africa; moreover, the 
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Party declared its intension to increase aid disbursements to 1% of national income. 
The endeavor of these actions was to combat the influence of Soviet Union in the 
continent and to decline imperialist exploitation under the capitalist enterprises 
through channeling more aid (Kelemen, 2007.) 
Regarding the institutions that manage aid policy, in conjunction with decolonization 
period, the U.K founded the Department of Technical Cooperation in 1961 to provide 
technical assistance to the newly independent states. Then in 1964, the government 
managed British aid through the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM). While in 
the 1970s the management of foreign aid changed more than once. First the ODM 
affiliated to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) with the name of 'Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA)' then it separated from FCO to back as a 
ministry. Finally in 1979 it returned to the FCO (DFID, 2011). This change could be 
explained by the international economic crises occurred in the 1970s and the lack of 
available resources.  
After the Labour Party formed the government in 1997, the British development aid 
has been managed by a separated institution, 'the Department for International 
Development (DFID)' which is headed by a cabinet minister. The establishment of 
DFID was combined with the reviews occurred by BWI, UN agencies and OECD on 
the essence of development cooperation. On the other hand, being an independent 
entity separated from the FCO has led to separate development efforts that focus on 
poverty reduction from other national interests such as trade relations and investment 
(Porteous, 2005.)  
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In the light of the new architecture of international aid that coincided in the late of 
1990s, the DFID's mission on drawing aid policies are determined in three main areas 
(DFID, 1997):  
1- Promoting sustainable economic growth with focusing on local economic 
development in rural areas. In addition to protecting human rights including 
women rights via preventing violence and conflicts.  
2- Improving human development through providing the poor with primary 
education and basic health care for infants and women as long as facilitating their 
access to save water and food.   
3- Reserving environment through effective use of renewable and non - renewable 
resources.  
Oliver Morrissey (2002) claims that establishing DFID has deployed the British aid 
policy effectively. The amount of aid disbursements and the number of staff and 
country offices have increased. More important, management by results and planning 
long term strategies have been the adopted approaches in addition to the focus on 
regular evaluation.  Further, being as a separate governmental entity enables DFID to 
negotiate and influence the other government bodies (OECD 2009.)  
The Labour Party issued two international development acts. The first was in 2002; 
this act determines the functions and sectors that the British development aid should 
be allocated and the modalities of aid disbursements. Generally, the act identifies 
poverty reduction as the target of ODA and concerning the forms of assistance, they 
include grant, loan and guarantee; technical assistance, that transfers the knowhow, 
scholarship and tied aid. The act clarifies that the treasury is responsible for setting 
the conditions of giving loans to developing countries. As well, the relation with 
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multilateral organizations and private sectors are arranged in this act (International 
Development Act, 2002.) 
The second act declared in 2006; emphasizes on the methods of monitoring and 
evaluation of the British development aid. It illustrates how to allocate aid 
disbursements effectively with targeting the international commitment of 0.7% of 
GNI. Thus, it affirms on identifying the development objectives with the recipient 
countries clearly and the budget cycle. Further, the act demonstrates the way of 
submitting annual reports from the Secretary of International Development to the 
parliament (International Development 'Reporting and Transparency' Act, 2006.) 
The British governments prepared various white papers to identify the main principles 
of aid allocation and to guide actions in the filed. The first white paper (Command 
Paper 2736) prepared in 1965 after the most of colonies got their independences. 
Poverty reduction was determined the overreaching objective of ODA. In the 1975 
another command paper (6270) released has claimed that the rural development 
would be the adopted approach to reduce poverty (DFID, 1997.)  
Under the Labour Party government four white papers were published; the first one 
was in 1997 when the Party seized the power, the second in 2000; the third was in 
2006 and it was built on the outputs of the international summit on Africa in 2004 and 
the final white paper was published in 2009.  
The first white paper in 1997 is coincided with the global objective of the new 
millennium to reduce the number of extreme poor to the half by 2015; however, the 
rationale of reducing poverty is based on attaining economic growth via adopting neo 
liberal policies. Further, the paper affirms on the role private sectors, civil society 
organizations and research institutions in delivering development goals (DFID, 1997.) 
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The second white paper that published in 2000 emphasizes on globalization as a 
determinant of international development. The paper addressed that globalization 
embeds impediments and opportunities to overreach the international goal. 
Accordingly, the British development aid would target four aspects: building the 
capacity of poor states so that they could adopt and implement pro poor economic 
policies and fight corruption that deters development; improving human development 
in terms of education and health in addition to technology; the third area is to employ 
the private sector in financing development specially globalization promotes the role 
of enterprises in the international system with decreasing trade barriers. The final area 
is to protect environment to guarantee sustainable development (DFID, 2000.) 
Regarding the amount of aid that would disburse to the targeted areas, the paper 
argues that under globalization conditions available development assistances have 
been directing to the middle income countries that have good economic performance 
while the poor countries have been receiving little amount of ODA. Therefore the 
government promised in this white paper to allocate 0.33% of GNP for development 
aid in 2003/2004 budget and to direct 74% of this allocation to the poorest countries 
including African countries (DFID, 2000.)  
The third white paper was published after two years from the summit on Africa 
Development. Thus it affirms on the recommendations of the summit mainly the 
necessary of doubling the amount of ODA directed to African countries. In this 
regard, the paper indicated that U.K under the government of Labour Party has 
increased the amount of aid by 140% from 1997 till 2005 (DFID, 2006.)  
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Despite the paper has tackled the same focus areas of aid allocation addressed in the 
previous white papers; technical researches for improving human conditions and 
fragile states are determined additional areas (DFID, 2006.)    
The current white paper that guided British aid policy was published in 2009 after 
Blair left the government. The successor Prime Minister Gordon Brown has used a 
slight different discourse; besides affirming on the role of the U.K as the defender of 
the poor in the international system; he declared that the attainment of national 
security is a fundamental objective of aid disbursements.  In the forward section of the 
white paper, the Prime Minister Brown stated 'The United Kingdom will keep the 
promises we have made. We will do so because it is morally right. But also because 
our prosperity, security and health are increasingly inseparable from events far 
beyond our borders' (DFID, 2009, P.5.) 
This white paper, like the second one published in 2000, departed form the global 
challenges facing the poor countries such as international economic fluctuations; 
transboundary conflict and climate change. To combat these challenges, the British 
aid will endorse economic growth in sustainable and environmental way and will 
direct its ODA to the poorest countries, fragile states and vulnerable people.  Above 
that, the British ODA will be allocated in a collective way as the U.K will work with 
the UN agencies to meet the MDGs and with G8 to improve the effectiveness of 
ODA. It could be noticed that this paper tackles ways of aid effectiveness explicitly 
(DFID, 2009.) 
2.1.3 Harmonization policies  
The aforementioned white papers have placed significant emphasis on the 
international coordination in delivering ODA. The various dimensions of coordination 
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including the relation with other donors; areas of focus and aid modality have been 
conceived in the papers.   
Concerning the coordination with other donors; it could be noticed that the U.K has 
the real willing to increase the cooperation with multilateral organizations and other 
donor countries. In the white paper of 1997, the paper indicates to the importance of 
coordination with other donors without emphasis on the techniques of fostering this 
sort of coordination. For example, it is stated 'We Shall Work closely with other 
donors and  development  agencies  to  build partnerships with developing countries 
to  strengthen  the  commitment  to  the elimination  of  poverty…' (DFID, 1997, p. 6.) 
The second paper published in 2000, shows the coordination with Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Sweden in Tanzania and in Malawi for 
promoting the sector wide approach. 
However, after the Paris Declaration in 2005, the coordination with other donor 
countries has increased. The third White paper in 2006 addressed that it has 
harmonized the allocation of its disbursements with other donors in 20 recipient 
countries; adopted joint strategies in 6 countries and joint office in two countries and 
the South Sudan is one of both cases (DIFD, 2006). Moreover, it has shared technical 
advisers with other donors; for instance, it got assistance from WB staff and it shared 
economic adviser with Netherlands in Rwanda (OECD, 2010a). In a step forward to 
harmonization, the U.K shared information of its implemented operations via DIFD 
databases and joined the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) (DIFD, 
2009). However, the white paper pointed to the drawback in the monitoring and 
evaluation systems (DFID, 2006.)   
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Although the U.K is trying to delegate its operations, it is addressed that 61% of 
British staff allocated in the head offices while 39% of the staff in the field; further, 
the staff who are in the field have lacked the capability and the authority to foster 
coordination with other donor agencies in the same field (OECD, 2009.) 
The rationale of enhancing the coordination with the multilateral organizations is 
'Their [multilateral development institutions]  political  neutrality  and  technical 
expertise enable them to take a leadership and  coordination  role  on  major  problems 
and  global  issues  such  as  debt  reduction, human    rights    and    refugees,    
gender equality,  the  environment  and  the  AIDS pandemic.' (DFID, 2006, P. 34.) 
Further, it is addressed that when the U.K lacks the financial or technical capability in 
delivering certain targets, it will direct its available assistance to the multilateral 
organization that has the comparative advantages. Though the criterion is the 
comparative advantage, it seems that the U.K prefers to allocate its ODA to the 
multilateral organizations than to the appropriate donor country. Therefore in 1997, 
the U.K declared that the half of its ODA actually directed to the multilateral 
organizations including the UN agencies; WB and EU (DFID, 1997). And in the 2006 
white paper, it claimed that 40% of aid disbarments would channel through 
multilateral organizations.  To conceive the coordination with the multilateral 
organizations, it encourages the UN to adopt one budget and one program 
representing development objectives of the UN agencies so that it can reduce 
duplication and fragmentations of UN programs; further, it recommends donor 
countries to direct their disbursements to the UN agencies. In this respect, the U.K 
promotes the coordination among the regional development banks (DFID, 2006.)  
63 
 
The focus of the final white paper is on aid effectiveness thus it affirms on improving 
the ability of multilateral organizations and regional development banks to respond 
effectively to the development needs and priorities of the poor countries. Increasing 
the representation of the poor countries in the executive bodies of these organizations 
is crucial to attain responsiveness (DFID, 2009.)  
Regarding the focus areas, the poverty reduction is the main target and according to 
this goal the U.K allocates its disbursements. Moreover, the cooperation with other 
bilateral and multilateral donors is condition on their commitment to implement 
poverty reduction strategies (DIFD, 1997; 2000; 2006); for instance, the budget of 
2007/2008, the U.K allocated 44% of the total aid to MDGs operation (OECD, 
2010a.)  
 However, the Conservative Party since 2010 emphasizes on gender, wealth creation, 
climate change and fragile state (OECD, 2010b.)  
The U.K adopted selectivity in geographic areas and operations; for the geography, it 
believes that ODA should target to the poorest countries that most of them in Africa 
thus African countries and African organizations such as the African Development 
Bank are the main destination of British aid. Within the poorest countries, it attain to 
direct aid disbursements to countries that prove political will to adopt reform and 
reduce poverty therefore it decreased its operations to a third since 1997 and currently 
the DFID offices are serving in 23 countries (DFID, 2009).  
Regarding aid modality; in spite of claiming that the sector- wide approach is better 
modality of aid allocation to maintain the principle of ownership. other forms have 
been addressed in the white papers such as capital  aid  that channeled to specific 
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projects  or  activities;  program  aid to support the balance   of   payments and budget 
and technical aid such as training and scholarships. 
Channeling aid to the government budget requires that the recipient country to adopt 
financial reforms and to develop the accountability system; therefore the U.K is 
committed to allocate just 5% of the disbarments to the national budget while the 
recipient country implements the reforms (OECD, 2010b.) 
In the regard of aid predictability, the U.K claimed to use the Medium-term 
predictability as it will share its aid budget plan for three years in advance and there is 
intention to use ten-year Development Partnership Arrangements (DPAs) (OECD, 
2010b.) 
 
2.2 Denmark  
2.2.1 Foreign policy toward Africa  
The location of Denmark as a small state between strong western European countries 
and the Scandinavian countries in the north of Europe determines its foreign policy. 
Since the end of the Second World War, Denmark's foreign policy is between two 
different purposes; the first is to attain the direct national interests in security and 
economic prosperity while the second is to deploy the Nordic identity (Ben Tonra, 
2001.)   
To attain the national interests; the Western powers represented in NATO and EU are 
the fundamental arrangements to protect the national interests. Concerning security 
and defense issues, Denmark joined the NATO early as the alliance with the USA 
guarantees the purposed security. Accordingly, Denmark has involved in the NATO 
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operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and in Iraq. The relation with NATO has the 
highest priority in the Danish foreign policy (Tonra, 2001.)   
For enhancing its economic growth, the European Union is an essential partner 
though it did not join the European Coal and Steal Community in the beginning 
because the steel and cool were not important products for its economy; further, the 
main trade partners including the U.K did not involve in the first EU arrangement. 
When Denmark applied for joining the EU in 1961, it took this action based on the 
U.K that applied as well for the EU membership and although their applications were 
rejected due to political rivalry with France, they applied again in the 1970 and joined 
the EU (Tonra, 2001.)    
Since being EU member, the relation with the EU has the highest priority in Danish 
foreign policy and it has been working to deepen its role within the union. For 
example, it encouraged the EU enlargement in 2004 because it is considered an 
opportunity for Danish exports. However, to maintain its position among the 25 
member states, Denmark urges for the bilateral connections among members in 
discussing and designing policies (Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen, 2004.) 
To retain its Nordic identity, Denmark has worked to convince this aim through 
institutionalization its relation with Nordic countries. In 1952, it initiated the Nordic 
Council to be a collective arrangement discussing the security and defiance issues. 
Later in 1962, the Nordic Cooperation Agreement was founded then it followed by an 
initiation to establishing a regional custom Union (NORDEK). These Nordic 
arrangements had not been successful to develop common Nordic objectives in 
security and foreign policy issues due to the conflict of interests among Nordic 
countries and the nature of relation with the EU; in this regard, Denmark was blamed 
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that it emphasized on its relation with western European countries (Tonra, 2001). 
Evidently, promoting the Nordic identity has not been a priority for Denmark with the 
security and economic challenges it has been facing. For example, in 2009 a report 
was prepared to show how Nordic countries could endorse collective security, the 
report concluded that the difference of political strategies and interests have precluded 
any attempt to develop a collective security; above that, the Nordic countries involve 
in NATO prefer to manage their defense issues through NATO (Clive Archer, 2010). 
Further, with the global economic crisis in 2008, the Nordic cooperation became on 
the agenda as a tool to combat this crisis; however, Denmark has tackled this possible 
solution with doubts (Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen, 2010.)  
Apparently, Denmark has designed its foreign policy objectives based on its national 
interests which are compatible with NATO and EU whilst the cooperation with the 
Nordic countries is on the minimum level.  
Regardless the two different directions of Danish foreign policy, the Minister of the 
Foreign Policy, Per Stig Møller in 2003 addressed in the article "European Foreign 
Policy in the Making', published in the Brown Journal of Foreign Affairs, that since 
the end of the cold war, the objectives of Danish foreign policy are: Promoting the 
international peace and stability with enhancing the values of democracy and human 
rights; endorsing economic growth and sustainable development and it focuses on  
combating the global risks such as immigration and terrorism and the last objective is 
fostering integration with 'neighbouring areas'(Carlsen and Mouritzen 2004.) 
The main purpose of Denmark is to play a proactive role in the international area and 
to exert more influence in the international and regional organizations to overcome its 
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small size. Thus it involves in various military and development operations around the 
world.  
Africa is a space where Denmark deploys its capabilities and influence. To attain the 
objective of promoting peace and stability; Denmark has participated in the UN peace 
troops after the end of the cold war. For instance, Denmark led the initiative of UN to 
establish a rapid force in Rwanda in 1994 and it sent observers to DRC. Further, 
Denmark has provided assistances to African arrangements to prevent conflict and 
build peace; in 1997 it assisted the SADC in conflict management (Ståle Ulriksen, 
2007.)   
The modest cooperation with the Nordic countries has been emerged in the African 
continent. Denmark was out of the scene when other Nordic countries (Sweden, 
Finland and Netherlands) sent their assistances to African countries under the conflict 
of Congo in 1960 while Denmark has participated effectively in the NATO operations 
in the East of Africa to counter terrorism (Ståle Ulriksen, 2007.) 
Regarding the role of good partner, Danish development assistance has exceeded the 
international commitment. Generally, it is committed to provide assistances to African 
countries and it declared that in 2004 during the G8 summit on Africa and the UN 
World Summit on Development Goals.  
The Danish government determined three main objectives toward Africa in 2007-
2011 stated in its Africa Strategy (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007); 
they are:  
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1- Promoting African responsive to the challenges of globalization which are 
relevant to Danish security and interests; particularly migration, trade relations 
and conflict.  
2- Fostering the economic cooperation between Africa and the EU. 
3- Allocating more aid in effective way to African countries with focusing on 
vulnerable people.  
The Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen in his speech delivered in the 
occasion of the visit of the American president George W.Bush in Denmark in 2005 
highlighted the main priority areas of Danish aid in Africa: health caring with 
focusing on fighting HIV/AIDS; trade relations; conflict management and good 
governance (Hvidt and Mouritzen, 2006.) 
2.2.2 The Danish Aid Policy  
Denmark illustrates its contribution in development cooperation to the poor countries 
including Africa as a 'humanitarian responsibility'.  
Danish aid disbursements was institutionalized in 1963 by establishing DANIDA as 
an independent entity to manage development assistance. Since the 1990, it is 
affiliated to the ministry of foreign affairs and it is headed by The Minister for 
Development Cooperation. Four legal acts organize Danish development assistance; 
the fundamental act issued in 1998 then the supplementary acts declared; two in 2002 
and the last one in 2006* (DANIDA website.)  
Fighting poverty is the main target of DANIDA mission and throughout 50 years it 
has channeled a lot of disbursements that exceeds the international commitment of 
 
 *The acts are available only in Danish language thus I could not interpret them.  
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0.7% of GNI. It could be noted that the priorities of Danish aid are drawn on the 
political and economic risks and the opportunities of globalization. Though 
development assistance is usually direct to human development goals, Denmark 
declared after the end of the cold war that its aid disbursements would have political 
goals mainly in conflict prevention and building democracy (DANIDA, 2003). These 
political goals have been intensified after the 9/11 attack in the USA which was 
followed by NATO military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq to fight terrorists.  
The government publishes every four years The Government’s Vision for New 
Priorities in Danish Development Assistance that determines the objectives and 
approaches of aid allocation.  
Five development priorities had been set for the period from 2004- 2008; poverty 
reduction is the highest priority; human rights, democratization and good governance; 
stability, security and the fight against terrorism; refugees, humanitarian assistance; 
environment protection and social and economic development (DANIDA, 2003.)  
The following agenda that covered the period from 2005 to 2009 continued the 
emphasis on the main priorities in the areas of fighting poverty and improving the 
conditions of the poor focusing on the health sector and fighting the epidemic diseases 
particularly HIV/AIDS and adopting the international initiatives on environment. 
However economic development would be approached through increasing the 
capability of private sector to be able to access to the Danish market. Fighting 
terrorism with focusing on Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan where the NATO operations 
had been a focal intervention areas; in addition to promoting equality and 
democratization in the Middle East countries (DANIDA, 2004). Because this 
70 
 
document was published after the G8 summit on Africa, providing economic relations 
with Africa took eminent space in the strategy.   
The Danish Development Assistance 2006-2010 approached its priorities through 
enabling the poor countries to benefit from globalization opportunities and to 
overcome challenges. The tool is promoting the role of the EU and UN agencies as 
the essential partner in the development cooperation; further environment security 
human rights and democracy had been retained the same focus areas (DANIDA, 
2005.)  
In 2008, Danish government initiated the Africa commission to share development 
visions and plans under the global recession between Denmark and African countries. 
The outcome of the commission was published in a report in 2009.  The report argues 
that Africa is facing economic and financial crises; however, it should maximize its 
opportunities from globalization dynamics through attracting investment with 
enhancing the agriculture business. Deepening the rule of law and improving the 
status of women and other vulnerable have to be embedded in any adopted reform 
processes. On the other side, private sectors and entrepreneurs have to participate in 
planning and implementing development policies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark, 2009.) 
The commission determined 5 main initiatives to foster the economic growth 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2009):  
1- Improving the capacity of African enterprises to be able to compete in the 
global market.   
2- Developing the financial systems particularly a predictable regulatory 
framework in African countries to improve the business environment. 
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Therefore an African Guarantee Fund would be founded to be a pool of 
resources needed by the starting up enterprises.  
3- Creating job opportunities for youth through encouraging entrepreneurship 
and self employment; in this regard, the ILO would provide the technical 
assistance.  
4- Securing the sustainability of electricity and other resources needed to run 
growing businesses.   
5-   Improving the quality of education mainly the vocational education to supply 
the rising enterprises.   
According to these five initiatives, Denmark and donors would allocate their 
assistances as long as African governments are committed to good governance   
principles (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2009.) 
'Make Africa free aid continent' was stated in the report as an intended goal of African 
countries and Denmark would assist them to attain this goal. Therefore, the report sets 
recommendations to pave the African aid independency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Denmark, 2009); they are drawn on three pillars:  
1- Economic pillar: deepening the role of the private sector mainly in the 
agriculture sector because flourishing this leading economic sector could 
enable African countries to meet the MDGs; with reshaping the relation 
between the private and public sectors in a way that benefit the intended 
economic growth. Additionally, encouraging the regional integration and 
South -South cooperation.  
2- Political pillar: Promoting the implementation of governance principles in 
addition to ensuring the participation of all stakeholders in planning 
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development strategies. Also ensuring the role of women in development 
process.  
3- Environment pillar: Protecting environment through embedding quality 
standards in the new industries.     
2.2.3 Harmonization policies 
Aid effectiveness as a goal of Danish aid is mentioned in the documents of the 
priorities of development assistance implicitly. The priorities that have been set after 
the Paris declaration have not discussed aid effectiveness in details. Though, this part 
will try to interpret what have been mentioned in the government documents and to 
correlate that to the principle of harmonization including the relation with other 
donors; areas of focus and aid modality.   
Regarding the relation with other donors, Denmark emphasizes on its cooperation 
with bilateral donors rather than multilateral organizations; however, the cooperation 
is conditional. For multilateral organizations, it intends to increase the cooperation 
with the UN agencies for instance but only with agencies that have good performance 
and impact and have the same priorities; for example in 2004-2008 it allocated aid 
disbursements to the UN agencies service in health and population policy (DANIDA, 
2003). Above that, it decreased the amount of aid to the multilateral organizations and 
redirected to the new program implemented by the government. (DANIDA, 2005). On 
the other side, it claimed that the multilateral organizations have the responsibilities of 
developing common values and principles managing the cooperation among donors in 
that case Denmark would assist organizations to reform their systems and to be more 
inclusive.    
73 
 
The relation with other donors is determined by 'like minded' donors and the priority 
of cooperation is with European countries. It is stated 'we need to cooperate with the 
Nordic countries and like-minded EU Member States that share our attitude to 
development policy and strengthen the coherence between Europe’s external efforts 
and the common development policy formulated' (DANIDA, 2003, p.5.)   
Accordingly, the cooperation is conditioned on sharing common priorities and 
approaches; further, it urges the PRSP to be the common objective that donors could 
draw their joint strategies; action plans and joint procurement policy (DANIDA, 
2004; 2005.)   
Using decentralization in administrating its country offices is one of attributes of 
Danish aid and this action could foster harmonization on the field because it 
empowers the staff in the field to be able to take decision moreover, it provides them 
with guidelines to facilitate the implementation on the ground (DANIDA, 2003).  In 
this regard, it is reported for the OECD that the 73% of staff in the field offices and 
27% are in the head quarters (OECD 2009.)  
According to the OECD surveys on the progress toward the Paris Declarations; 
Denmark achieved the target of joint missions by 34% in 2005 and 44% in 2007 and 
regarding the Joint country analytical work, it conducted that by 80% in 2005 and 
85% in 2007. While it is on track regarding using common arrangements, it reached 
60% in 2005 and 2007 (OECD, 2011b.) 
Though its implicit performance in harmonization, it blames donors as their 
procedures and requirements are not harmonized and that increase the burden on the 
developing countries (DANIDA, 2004). As a part of proactive role in development 
cooperation, it initiated in 2005 to establish a high-level forum to stimulate donors to 
74 
 
harmonize their activities (DANIDA, 2004). On the other side, it welcomes the 
cooperation with new donors but it limits this cooperation to exchange lessons only 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2010.)  
Regarding the focus areas, attaining MDGS is the target of Danish aid; on the other 
hand, aid is allocated to assist African countries facing the global economic 
challenges with emphasis on the vulnerable people such as women and youth. 
However the driving mechanism to meet development goals is private sector thus it 
directs disbursements to this sector.   
Geographically; its approach is to concentrate on small countries but to proliferate its 
programs to cover different sectors. For instance, in 2001, it had 18 country offices 
this number decreased to 13 offices by the end of 2008. However, recipient country 
has to be serious about political and economic reforms to be selected. Selection 
countries is based on three criteria though Denmark admits it is political choice by the 
end: 1) development need; the degree of poverty and vulnerability within the country; 
2) the instability and conflict within the country or surrounding countries; 3) the 
ability of Danish aid to achieve impact and visible results, that is based on its 
competence comparing to other donors; techniques of involvement such as division of 
labor and the degree of involvement which is affected by the capacity and the quality 
of recipient government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2010.) 
Concerning the aid modality; Denmark is committed to reduce the tied aid (DANIDA, 
2003). While using the sector wide approach is unreached because it allocates aid 
according to the priorities not sectors; for example, promoting the role of private 
sector in agriculture is a priority thus it allocates aid based on one priority not on two 
different sectors (OECD, 2011b.) 
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Regarding the budget support, Denmark allocates only 25% of the total disbarments 
until the recipient government guarantees the quality of its financial and 
administrative systems (OECD, 2009.)  In 2005, Denmark adopted the tool of 
'commitment budgeting' in order to predict the activities and operations that 
implemented by DANIDA (DANIDA, 2005); however, the budget plans are 
overlapped; for example, there are two development assistance budget documents one 
covers the period (2009-2013) and the second covers the (2010-2014).  
2.3 British and Danish commitments to the international and regional declarations 
Both the UK and Denmark are committed to the international decelerations on aid 
effectiveness. Though they have been interested to allocate their disbursements 
effectively in order to decrease the transaction costs, their commitments to all 
principles of aid effectiveness have been included apparently in their documents on 
aid policy after the 2005. On the other side, they have participated in all surveys 
conducted by the OECD and they have met the targets by 2010.  
However their commitments to the EU policies on aid effectiveness are different. In 
principle both admit the significant role of the EU as a main multilateral donor and its 
considerable development impacts in developing countries. The UK has translated 
this acknowledgement into action; it has allocated about 30% of its ODA to the EU 
institutions (DFID, 1997); moreover, it admits that the EU has a comparative 
advantage in planning and financing MDGs programs and projects and in cases of 
fragile states therefore it has channeled its disbursements through the EU institutions 
(DFID, 2009.) 
On the contrary, Denmark has perceived the EU as a domain where it could project its 
capabilities to the international arena; accordingly, it has deepened its position in the 
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EU through embedding its development plans into the EU strategy and promoting the 
division of labour among member states in order to influence the other countries 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2010). More important, Denmark has not 
allocated its disbursements unless the donor organization shares the same 
development targets.  
Apart from the international and regional commitments, the Nordic countries and the 
UK are formed the NORDIC plus. Through this regional arrangement the UK and 
Denmark share their aid policies. NORDIC plus has produced different toolkits and 
guidelines to facilitate harmonization among member donors. delegated cooperation; 
Joint Assessment of Agencies; Joint-Financing Arrangements in Programme Support 
and Joint Procurement Policy are four aspects of the mutual harmonization. The 
progress in this regard has been limited to preparing guidelines and determining the 
reporting systems as no progress report has been released to demonstrate the 
performance of member countries.   
Bertil Odén (2011) explained through different incidents that Denmark has not been 
committed to the Nordic countries as it usually prioritizes its national interests. 
Overall, there is no consensus among Nordic countries on development cooperation.  
On the other side, Odén demonstrates the Nordic model in delivering aid; focusing on 
the low income countries; supporting the UN agencies and large share of grant aid. 
The British aid policy has not had the same characteristics until 2004, when it 
reaffirmed on its commitments to the poorest countries; above that, its aid 
disbursement has not reach the international commitment unlike the Nordic countries.  
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To sum up, the Nordic countries have a significant role in translating the international 
commitments on aid harmonization into action via developing guidelines; however, 



























THE AID POLICY OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES 
This chapter will tackle the reaction of recipient countries to the applied aid policies 
of donors. It will discuss the pace of development and the role of foreign aid in 
financing the development strategies; then it will show the change and continuity in 
the received aid amount and modality and how the recipient countries manage the 
negotiation with donors.   
3.1 Tanzanian Development and Aid Policies  
3.1.1 The pace of development:  
Tanzania is one of African countries that designed its model of development after the 
independence in 1961. Julius Nyerere led the independence battle then he became the 
national leader and the first president of the state. He believed in socialism and 
emphasized on the role of farmers driving the development process. Axiomatically, 
Nyerere did not believe in the Western interventions thus he was not eager to depend 
on the Western aid in building the new state and funding the development projects.  
Notwithstanding the beliefs of the national leader regarding the new state, the first 
development plan after the independence in 1961-1964 was drawn by Britain. The 
plan focused on building the industrial sector to substitute imports in order to increase 
the national production. The second development plan from 1964 to 1969 was 
formulated by British as well and it aimed to encourage national industries and 
production with focusing on agriculture sector. The performance of the economy was 
stable and the rate economic growth was 2%. Nyerere did not reject the Western 
intervention at the beginning but he limited it to support the modernization of 
machines used in the agriculture, the lead sector of economy and development 
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processes; further, he tried to dominate the structure of production (Kjell Havnevik, 
2010.) 
In 1967, the Nyerere's development model was applied. 'Arusha Declaration' is a 
socio- economic model where the village is the core of development and the rural 
economy is the driving force of development and the state dominates the all means of 
production. Nyerere thought that the capitalist relation between who haves and 
employees does not fit with the traditional African society thus his model fights the 
fundamental elements of capitalist 'individual tenure' (Havnevik, 2010.) Gradually, a 
socialist state had been consolidated as all enterprises and sectors had been 
nationalized and the state monopolized the production. Western powers and BWIs 
supported this model because its socialist base was compatible with political ideology 
of donor countries at that time in addition to the strategic location of Tanzania 
(Samuel M Wangwe, 1997). However this model was not sustained as a successful 
model; there were internal and external impediments. Internally, the spread of 
illiteracy and the inefficiency of the public administration due to corruption; above 
all, the low productivity of the agriculture sector led to instability of the national 
economy. Externally, the model was faced by donor conditionality and the lack of 
support; additionally, the dependence on techniques and human resources imported 
from donors, delayed the development of the national human resources all of that was 
combined by Nyerere's refractoriness against IMF and WB dictations. In order to 
rescue this model, the Tanzanian government declared the national Economic 
Survival Programme in 1981-1982 (Robert J. Utz, 2007 and Planning Commission, 
n.d.)  
After Nyerere left the power in 1985, the structural adjustment program was 
implemented according to the neo liberal bases. The "Economic Recovery 
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Programme" 1986-89 (ERP) applied with the attainment of liberalizing internal and 
external trade, unifying the exchange rate, reviving exports, stimulating domestic 
saving, and restoring fiscal sustainability and mobilizing the local resources.  In 1989 
the second phase of adjustment program "Economic and Social Action Programme" 
(ESAP) was adopted and it directed to the bank sector; public administrations and 
modifying the legislations and regularities to foster privatization (Arne Bigsten and 
Anders Danielsson, 1999.) 
The Structural Adjustment program did not accomplish a visible progress due to the 
spread of corruption in the public sector, income inequality and regional disparities in 
gaining the output of reform. The WB responded to that deficits by applying the 
Priority Social Action Programme (PSAP)' aiming at providing social services to the 
poor (Bigsten and Danielsson, 1999.) 
Consequently, a new development plans was formulated in 1995 under the leadership 
of the new president Benjamin Mkapa. It emphasized on diminishing the intervention 
of the state in the agriculture sector with improving its trade relations with 
neighboring countries in the east of Africa.  The result was the increase of the national 
economic growth rate to 5.2% from 1998 to 2003 (Utz, 2007.)   
The goal of the successor national development plan that formulated in 1997 was 
social development based on the cooperative society that was formulated under the 
Arusha model. It aimed to distribute the economic gains to all segments of the society 
therefore the components of the plan were education, health care and women 
participation (The United Republic of Tanzania, 1997.)   
With adopting the HIPC, the first national strategy for poverty eradication was 
designed in 1998 and it aimed to decrease the poverty to 50% by 2010 and the 
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absolute eradication by 2025. This strategy set the framework of the group of 
initiatives that targeted poverty eradication and the participation of local communities, 
women and other stakeholders in planning and implementing. The strategy attained to 
achieve 8- 10% economic growth annually (The United Republic of Tanzania, 1998.) 
Before the new millennium, in 1999 the Tanzanian government proclaimed a long 
term national development strategy entitled Vision 2025 (Planning Commission, n.d.); 
the pillars of development are:   
• Increasing the quality of live through providing a secured and sustainable 
access to the basic needs: food and water, primary education and health with 
emphasis on  women equality 
• Promoting the elements of good governance; basically fighting the faces of 
corruption and ensuring the rule of low. Additionally, encouraging political 
participation and embedding the insights of all stakeholders in development 
plans.  
• Strengthening the national economy and increasing its competiveness thus the 
growth rate has to be 8% annually by 2025; the inflation be decreased and 
local development be thrived.  
The later national development plans have been inspired by the Vision 2025 and have 
met the requirements of the poverty reduction papers (PRSPs). The objectives of the 
PRSP that designed in 2000 are: reducing income poverty, improving human 
capabilities, containing extra vulnerability among the poor. And that guided by the 
principles of decentralization and participation of grassroots (The United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2000a.)  
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In 2004, the Tanzanian government proclaimed a distinct national development plan 
inspired by Asian development model and it targeted annual growth rate form 5-6 to 
8-10%. The plan focused on foreign direct investment as a driver of development and 
creating special economic zones. Thus the government would reform banking system 
and improve the infrastructure to attract the foreign investments (The United Republic 
of Tanzania, 2004.) 
The strategy of the 2005 aims at equal distribution of the growth; social protection to 
vulnerable people and accountability to combat corruption. The stability of economy 
and efficient institutions are determined the core of poverty reduction strategy (The 
United Republic of Tanzania, 2005.) 
3.1.2 Funding the national development plans  
The development plans that have been formulated after the independence were 
designed, funded and implemented by the ex-colonial power, the United Kingdom. 
While Nyerere built his model on self reliance, his argument is the basic elements of 
development are: land, people, good policies and leadership; therefore he suspected 
that foreign aid could lead to development. However, to start up his model, he 
depended on technical assistances provided by the BWIs and other donors such as 
advanced agriculture machines but he insisted to get loans not grants from donor 
organizations to limit their interventions (Havnevik, 2010.)  
Applying the SAPs did not attract foreign aid at the beginning because the first 
application aimed to liberalize sectors slowly thus donors were not eager to send their 
disbursements to Tanzania. Only 35% of the expected foreign disbursements directed 
to Tanzanian governments. Accordingly, during the 1980s the total ODA allocated to 
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Tanzania dropped sharply from US$700 million in 1982 to US$ 487million in 1985. 
While with the second phase of SAPs, the ODA increased US$ 1345 million in 1992. 
(Mbyoya Bagachwa et al, 1997). However, a drop was occurred and the foreign 
disbursements had diminished significantly which was led to 'Aid Fatigue' in the 1990 
and each part the donors and the Tanzanian government pointed their fingers at each 
others. For bilateral donors and IMF; the high rate of corruption; insufficient of tax 
system and the poor capability of government to manage different sectors led to the 
ineffectiveness of SAPs. On the other side, the government argued that the 
performance of the government had been better than other developing countries, 
though that, the requirements of donors put burden on the bureaucratic system 'They 
[The key economic officials and ministers] are frustrated by the sheer number of 
frequent meetings, reports, and contacts that donors require' (Bagachwa, 1997.p. 5.)  
Later by the end of 1990 and after setting the rules of the relation between the 
government and donors, the foreign disbursements had been increased and became the 
essential source of the national budget. It consisted of 16% of GDP in 1997/1998 then 
increased to 24% in the 2004/2005 budget (Utz, 2007.) 
However, the vision 2025 stated that the goal is to be free aid country 'Reactivate the 
commitment to self-reliance, and re-cultivate resourcefulness and savings culture in 
order to curb and overcome the donor dependency syndrome which has led many 
Tanzanians into unprecedented apathy' (Planning Commission, n.d., p.17. ) 
As well, funding the national poverty reduction strategy is based on foreign 
disbursements. For example the strategy shows that 13.5% of GNI in 2002 funded by 
ODA and most of them directed to social services and economic activities; while 
between10% and 30% allocated to debt relief as a part of HIPC (The United Republic 
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of Tanzania, 2004). Moreover, the strategy inquired –explicitly- donors to provide 
technical assistances to NGOs and enterprises to enable them to provide social 
services and to assist the government in monitoring and evaluating the national 
strategy (The United Republic of Tanzania, 1998). The share of ODA in the GNI has 
not been less than 10% since 2000 and in 2003 and 2007 it boomed to more than 16% 
as shown in the next chart. The most of ODA has been going to debt relief; it valued 
1,127.45 USD million from 2005-2009 and between 2006 and 2007 4,771.56 USD 
million allocated to debt relief (aid flow website.) 
(Figure 1) Total Net ODA as a Percentage of GNI 
Source: aidflow website  
According to reports prepared by Tanzanian governments and the World Bank, debt 
relief and implementing neoliberal policies in the financial sector particularly have 
contributed in increasing the economic growth to reach 7% in the first decade of 
2000s; however, the MDGs progress reports show that the number of people under the 
poverty line is increasing and it is difficult to decrease this number by 2015. 
Additionally, the unequal distribution of the income between the urban and rural areas 




3.1.3 Aid Management  
Due to the socialist perception of building the state and development after the 
independence and the central concept of self reliance, the relation between Tanzanian 
government and donors had not undergone effortlessly. According to the national 
development strategy that based on Arusha, the government set criteria of foreign aid 
allocation that includes: aid must not affect the independency of the state; must not 
contradict with assets of socialism and goals of Arusha and must to be delivered in 
loans so the government could repay it (Bagachwa, 1997.)  
Later, the crisis occurred in the 1990's and led donors to cut their disbursements to 
Tanzania. To combat this deadlock, Denmark initiated to form a committee to address 
the nature of relation between Tanzanian government and donors and it issued a 
report in 1995 called Helleiner's report. The committee was responsible for 
determining the rules of ownership and cooperation besides using better aid modality 
(Gerry K. Helleiner. et al, 1995.) 
Regarding ownership, the report identifies a group of challenges that hinder the 
ownership. Donors have not transferred the content and tools of administrating the 
project to the government after running it and in some cases donors have maintained 
their upper hand on all components of the implemented projects basically in technical 
programs or projects that implemented by different donors. Furthermore, the required 
reform has focused on economic aspects and ignored the role of politicians in 
facilitating the progress of implemented projects.  Above that, the conditions have 
been suggested and prepared by IMF and WB without negotiating with the 
government (Helleiner. et al, 1995.) 
86 
 
Accordingly the report recommends that the government has to design its national 
development strategy and to orient the bureaucrats with the segments of the strategy. 
Importantly, the government has the right to lead the implementation of all programs 
and projects even in the projects designed by donors (Helleiner. et al, 1995.) 
The report argues that donor countries and organizations have been the main cause of 
lack of ownership because they have been seeking to show that they are the dominant 
of the development process; additionally, there has been evident that donors 
'manipulate' to select national departments to work with because these departments 
have the same development priorities. Therefore, donors have to consult the recipient 
government from the first stage and compile between national priorities and donor 
imperatives (Helleiner. et al, 1995.) 
Concerning donor coordination; the report points to the conflict of interests among 
donors and the government. For instance, negotiations have been occurred with 
sectoral ministry without involving other master ministries mainly the planning 
commission and treasury which led to disagreement; further, there were 2000 projects 
funded by only 40 donors and the number of parallel project management systems 
have been increased. These behaviors have led to less coordination (Helleiner. et al, 
1995.) 
The recommendations for donors are to decrease the parallel project management 
systems; to share information about their aid polices and priorities including debt 
relief; to hold joint consultative meetings to decrease the transaction costs and to 
promote the coherence between their aid and investment policies. Regarding the 
conditions and aspects of reform, they will be led by IMF and the government has to 
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establish an Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC) to negotiate with IMF 
(Helleiner. et al, 1995.) 
For the government; the government has to improve the capacity of bureaucrats and 
the key ministries of planning and budget have to develop guidelines for ministries to 
guide them in negotiation (Helleiner. et al, 1995.) 
Concerning the aid modality, the report recommends that donors have to inform the 
government with the total disbursements directed to the country whether they will 
allocate to the national budget or channel to other non governmental entities. The 
report encourages donors to increase the aid allocation to sector or subsector rather 
than projects. Further, any disbursement has to be aligned to the national priorities. 
On the government side, it has to formulate its development plan for a long term to be 
easier for donors to design their aid policies; to improve the capacity of Ministry of 
Finance in order to be efficient in determining the real estimations of the national 
needs and expenditures. On the other side, the government has to reform the 
regulations and ways of collecting and allocating taxes to be more transparent and to 
fight corruption by the end (Helleiner. et al, 1995.) 
Institutionally, the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance are the 
government bodies that receive from internal ministries the national needs and 
manage the relation with donors. The Panning Commission has been responsible for 
negotiating with donors and other stakeholders such as private sector; presenting the 
development vision; and monitoring the implemented projects; while the Ministry of 
Finance has to prepare the national budget; to manage debt policies and to supervise 
the aid disbursements. However, the capabilities of these two bodies have been 
88 
 
inadequate thus they have focused on applying the regulations without effective 
monitoring of disbursements (Bagachwa, 1997.) 
With the PRSPs, the Tanzanian government established specialized institutions to 
manage aid. In 2000, the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) was formed, which is 
supervised by the Ministry of Finance, after a comprehensive assessment to the 
Tanzanian progress in macroeconomic reform; coordination with donors and 
democracy and governance. The results of the assessment showed that the number of 
parallel project management systems was high and the procedures of reporting and 
monitoring still put burden on the government bodies in addition to the high 
proliferation of projects; lack of transparency and accountability; the poor capacity of 
civil servants and the foreign consultants dominated the process of planning (The 
United Republic of Tanzania, 2000b.)  
In order to counter these challenges, the TAS provides five year strategic national 
framework reflecting the policy framework, national development agenda, priorities 
and the required elements to ensure ownership and partnership. So the rationale of 
TAS is to encourage the principle of partnership within national stakeholders and 
between the government and donors ' development partners' (The United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2000b.) The TAS is replaced in 2006 by the Joint Assistance Strategy for 
Tanzania (JAST) to be the next medium term framework that guides the cooperation 
with donors. It includes as action and monitoring plans and donors have been 
included; there are 19 bilateral and multilateral donors. The JAST focuses on the role 
of government bodies to attain aid effectiveness according to the 5 principles of Paris 
Declaration. Concerning harmonization, it focuses on promoting harmonization 
between the government and the donors (the United Republic of Tanzania, 2007); 
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however, it does not explain the role of each donor though it targeted to increase the 
division of labour by 2007. It just tackles the nature and structure of the dialogue 
between the government and donors (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2011.)  
In 2004 another institution was established "The Development Partners Group 
(DPG)". It includes 16 bilateral and 5 multilateral agencies. The ultimate aim is to 
handle the national arrangements based on the PRSPs, its objectives have been 
revised after the Paris Declaration to compatible with the principles of Paris 
declaration. Accordingly it aims to ensure sustainable dialogue among donors and the 
government; foster the harmonization among donors focusing on division of labour 
and lead partner, and lead the monitoring process and evaluation (The Development 
Partners Group in Tanzania website.) 
Additionally, the Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) was founded to undertake the 
monitoring process and the data has been collected from the progress reports and the 
OECD and WB surveys. It links the objectives and activities with the international 
targets addressed in Paris Declaration.   
3.2 Ghanaian Development and Aid Policies     
3.2.1 The Pace of Development  
Ghana gained its independence in 1957 with a satisfactory economic performance. 
Since it had humble debt and sufficient foreign exchange reserves, it was one of 
middle income countries in the continent. These adequate economic indicators 
coincided with the faith of Nkrumah to achieve development without depending on 
ex-colonial powers.  
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But, the experience of the sharp fall in cocoa prices in 1965 forced the National 
Liberation Council (NLC), which overthrew Nkrumah government in 1966, to get 
assistance from IMF to buffer this crisis. NLC government implemented IMF 
prescription: devalued currency and decreased public expenditures (Jean Harrigan& 
Stephen Younger, 2000 & Yvonne M. Tsikata, 2001).  Since this time, the relation 
between Ghanaian governments and BWIs and Western donors has been lasting.     
In 1983, the president Jerry Rawlings applied SAPs, which was the reference of the 
national development plan (Economic Recovery Program 'ERP'). Though Rawlings 
had socialist background, he agreed to adopt neoliberal policies for several economic 
and political causes. Economically; cocoa production declined because of droughts 
and poor agriculture policies. This decline in the main resource of national income led 
to cut in foreign exchange reserves and great deficit in trade balance. Furthermore; the 
government could not maintain the finance of state- owned enterprises (Tsikata, 2001 
& Kwame Boafo- Arthur, 2007). Politically; Boafo- Arthur (2007) argues that SAPs 
was the only available exit to face economic setbacks. In addition, the lack of political 
opposition alleviated adopting SAPs as a rational reform. So, Rawlings implemented 
SAPs in 1983 to survive and after one decade in 1992 he accepted the political 
conditionality and held the first multi candidate election.   
The ruling government, The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) 
formulated the Economic Recovery Program according to strategies of SAPs. While 
ERP divided officially into two phases: ERP 1 (1983-86) and ERP II (1987-89), some 
scholars divided it to six phases (Kwadwo Konadu – Agyemang & Baffour Takyi, 
2001) others combined it into three phases (Tsikata, 2001). Regardless of the number 
of phases, the ERP emphasized on five areas of reform which are pricing reform, 
fiscal policy, structural policies, and institutional reforms (Tsikata, 2001). 
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 On the short run, the program achieved notably economic progress. The GDP 
increased by 5% while the inflation rate decreased from 77% in 1981 to 9.5% in 1992, 
and trade barriers and tariffs were simplified and minimized (Tsikata, 2001). 
However, by the end of the 1980s, these economic gains fluctuated; moreover, 
education, health, and other social sectors decayed because of the cut in government 
expenditures. Consequently, the number of Ghanaians who live below the poverty 
line increased besides the private sector was not consolidated because of high interest 
rates (Konadu – Agyemang & Takyi, 2001).  
These drastic effects compelled the government to propose the Programme of Actions 
to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in 1987. This program 
received its acceptance from BWIs and Western donors. PAMSCAD is designed to 
reduce poverty through emphasizing on social policies, which were abandoned in 
ERP. Hence, it covers five main areas: community initiative, employment generation, 
actions to help the redeployed, basic needs of vulnerable groups, and education (Nii 
Kwaku Sowa, 2002.)  
In spite of this effort to overcome negative effects of applying neoliberal policies, 
social conditions did not improve sufficiently. Inequality and poverty extended 
around the country (Jon Kraus, 1999); moreover, debt accumulated and Ghana 
became among 41 countries of heavily indebted countries due to dependence on 
external inflows with limited capability to serve debt (Konadu – Agyemang & Takyi, 
2001, Harrigan& Younger, 2000).      
After political transition in 1992, the NDC government proposed a national 
development plan called "Ghana Vision 2020". The ultimate goal of this plan is to be 
a middle income country by 2020 through achieving solid progress in five 
development areas: human development, economic growth, rural development, urban 
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development and an enabling environment. Additionally, to attain this goal, the 
National Development Planning Commission prepared a medium term 5 year strategy 
(1996-2000) as a first step (Government of Ghana, 1995.) 
Ghana vision 2020 had been challenged by different reasons. Some argue that the role 
of the National Development Planning Commission was fragile and it could not 
defend the implementation of the plan, while others argue that the plan was not well 
formulated and the annual budget did not correspond to its initial objectives. 
(Government of Ghana, 2003 and Whitfield& Jones, 2009). However, the foremost 
reason is the change in political leader and elite when John Agyekum Kufour (the 
New Patriotic Party 'NPP') won the presidential election in 2000. President Kufour 
abandoned Ghana Vision 2020 and adopted the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative.  
Accordingly Ghana formulated Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS). The first 
strategy GPRP I (2003-2005) attained to enhance economic growth with stability 
besides improve human conditions. It emphasized on adopting monetary, fiscal, and 
trade measures that increase production and facilitate the development of private 
sector; in addition, provide basic needs and public services in rural and urban areas. 
Thus the GPRS I priorities are: infrastructure development, modernized agriculture 
based on rural development, enhanced social services, good governance, and private 
sector development. And implemented programs and projects are defined to reflect 
objectives of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (Government of Ghana, 
2003.) 
The second phase of poverty reduction strategy (2006-2009) designed to 'attain 
middle income status (with a per capita income of at least US$1000) by the year 2015 
within a decentralized, democratic environment accelerate' (Government of Ghana, 
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2005, p. 5). Thus, the name of strategy changed to Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (GPRS II). The main development areas of GPRS II have not changed 
dramatically from GPRS I; they are: continued macroeconomic stability, accelerated 
private sector-led growth, vigorous human resource development, and good 
governance and civic responsibility. But GPRS II gives high priority to develop 
human resources through enhancing the quality of education and training and to 
modernize agriculture sector. 
The current national strategy Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda 
(GSGDA) that covered the period 2010-2013 aims to reduce the poverty through 
increase the competiveness of the private sector, stimulate the investment in gas and 
oil and maintain the improvement in agriculture sector. To supply the economy with 
needed components, it has retained to develop the capability of manpower; improve 
the infrastructure and the efficiency of civil services (Government of Ghana, 2010.) 
3.2.2 Funding the national development plans 
The availability of cash crops such as cocoa has secured the required fund for 
development plans therefore Ghanaian economy was stable. The national leader 
Nkrumah believed in self reliance however he accepted to get aid from the Soviet 
Union to counter the influence of the USA and the Western bloc (Harrigan& 
Younger, 2000.) 
When the price of cocoa had fallen, the SAPs were implemented. Unlike Tanzania, 
donors allocated a lot of disbursements to Ghanaian government because of its 
adequate performance. The government received about US$ 270 million in 1984 then 
increased about US$ 10 million in two years (US$ 385 million) and reached to US$ 
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480 million in 1990.  Accordingly, the share of foreign aid of the GDP was about 10% 
in the late of 1980s (Chad Leechor, 1994.) 
Consequently, the vision 2020 considers the official development assistance a major 
international resource that would provide financial and technical assistance. That 
attitude has been translated in the national development plans. 
Ghana received about US$770 million between 2001 and 2007 consisting of 25% of 
budget revenue and 6% of GDP. Grant disbursement represented 52% of average aid 
flows while Concessional loans averaged 48% of aid flows (Government of Ghana, 
2008, p.7.)  
(Figure: 2) Ghana: Total Net ODA as a Percentage of GNI 
 
Source: aidflow website 
The chart shows the constant share of ODA in the national income; there has been not 
dramatic change just in 2004 and that is related to debt relief. More important, the 
share of ODA has been decreasing to 8% in 2007 and 2008.      
What's more, the government launched the Multi – Donor Budget Support (MDBS) in 
2003 with 9 donor agencies; increased to 11 in 2008. Donors disbursed about US$278 
million to MDBS in 2003 increased to US$ 525 million in 2010 because the MDBS 
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represents GPRS objectives and priorities the government commits to implement 
approved strategies (Dode Seidu, 2010 & Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 
2007).  
3.2.3 Aid Management  
The Ghanaian government played a notable role in formulating and implementing 
ERP. As the government initiated and proposed the development plans both ERP and 
PAMSCAD then they were discussed with BWIs officials. In addition; the capabilities 
and coherence of Ghanaian technocrats made them lead the negotiation with BWIs 
effectively. Above all, BWIs and Western donors considered Ghana as one of 
successful stories in the continent; therefore they gave them wide spaces in bargaining 
and implementing (Jeffrey Herbst, 1993& Tsikata, 2001). Since implementing SAPs, 
both the World Bank and IMF have led negotiations and coordination between the 
Ghanaian governments and donor community. (Herbst, 1993& Tsikata,2001). The 
government of Ghana under Rawlings was a tough negotiator. (Whitfield& Jones, 
2009). This position supported by the weakness of political opposition and the World 
Bank behaviors that maintained any economic setbacks to counter any opposition to 
SAPs (Tsikata, 2001.) 
Furthermore, Whitfield and Jones (2009) argue that the second term (2007) of the 
NPP government is seeking to formulate a national development plan funded by 
national resources "by letting donors fund what they want and focusing its resources 
on what they will not fund, rather than trying to reshape aid to fit its needs" (p.212). 
Apparently, the various Ghanaian governments aim to reduce its dependence on the 
foreign aid with utilizing the received amount of disbursements.  
The government formulated in 2010 the Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy (2011-2015).  
This strategy determines the relation between the government and donors in order to 
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reach the middle income country by 2020 after achieving the MDGs. Therefore the 
objective of the strategy are: ensuring the leadership of the government in planning 
and implementing development strategies; managing aid coordination with sharing 
responsibilities; designing the development strategy to be result driven and 'move[ing] 
beyond aid dependence' (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2010, p.16.) 
More important, the strategy highlighted first the drawbacks which have delayed the 
effectiveness such as less commitment to the national priorities due to inadequate 
planning from the government side or donors have insisted to allocate aid according 
to their priorities and discard the national plan. Further, the government has not had a 
unified system to manage the disbursements and the relation between the master 
ministry and other ministries and sectors have not well identified. Donors have been 
sharing incomplete information about their polices and disbursements and their 
reporting systems have been fragmented (Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning, 2010.)   
To counter these impediments, the strategy determines the rules to employ the 
principles of ownership and alignment besides effective managing of allocated aid.    
Regarding promoting aid coordination with the government form one side and among 
donors from another side, the government is committed to improve its administrative 
capacities mainly in collecting information and evaluation. As well, it will lead 
regular meetings between the donors and national stakeholders to set the funded 
programs according to the national strategy. Generally, the government believes that 
to manage the coordination with donors effectively might need to restructure the 
techniques of management and in this case it will include non DAC donors. On the 
other side, the government will work to persuade donors to provide the government 
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with complete information about their budget plans to increase the predictability. 
However, in the aspect of coordination among donors, the government let donors to 
formulate their joint activities without any recommendations! (Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning, 2010.)     
Institutionally, the Ministry of Finance has been in charge of managing the relation 
with donors; in addition to The International Economic Relations Division (IERD) 
that includes the unites of debt managements, aid management and technical 
cooperation; essentially, it serves as representative of the government to negotiate 
with donors and monitor their activities.  
Project Management Units (PMUs) are affiliated to each sector and coordinate with 
IERD; supposedly, each ministry sent its needs and views of projects to the cabinet 
that approved on plans of ministries then directed to the ministry of finance to 
negotiate with donors the needed projects. However, donors preferred to deal directly 
with each ministry to avoid the process of approval on projects by the national 
government thus PMU deal with donors directly (Ernest Aryeetey and Aidan Cox, 
1997.) 
In addition to the master role of the Ministry of Finance, a group of frameworks and 
strategies have been formulated to tackle the cooperation between the government and 
donors.  
The Ghana Partnership Strategy (GPS) was formed in 2005 as the primary 
arrangement combined all donors with the government. Through the annual meeting, 
donors with the government set the map of aided programs and projects according to 
the national development strategy; determine the harmonized actions and the 




Subsequently, in 2007 a detailed framework was formulated to determine the 
responsibilities of the government and donors. This framework is represented in the 
Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS) and it aims to ensure the alignment of 
donors with national development objectives and priorities which are inspired by the 
PRSP in addition to monitor the performance of the governments and donors. The   
G-JAS renewed every four years (G-JAS, 2007.)  
Furthermore, the government designed distinct frameworks and monitoring groups to 
follow up the effectiveness of aid modality.     
The government set the Framework Memorandum (FM) in 2003 as a base of 
negotiations with donors regarding the MDBS and it renewed in 2008. This 
memorandum is administrated by the Multi-Donor Budget Support Group to evaluate 
the commitments of the government and its way in managing the budget (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, 2010.) 
As well, the Sector Working Groups (SWGs) headed by the government and the lead 
donor in the sector have been formed to review the performance and the budget in 
each sector (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2010.)  
 Additionally, annual review and progress reports are conducted to evaluate the 
commitments of each part to the agreed actions represented in G-JAS.  
 
3.3 The Harmonization between UK and Denmark in Tanzania and Ghana   
British and Danish aid policies allocate to reduce poverty and their approach is 
increasing the economic growth and the role of private sector in development process. 
Africa is the destination of British and Danish aid because the poorest countries are 
located in this continent.  
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Before the new millennium, the UK had not established country office in African 
countries while it applied its aid policy through three regional offices; the East, South 
and central Africa. Then it has proliferated its offices started by the offices in Uganda, 
Nigeria and Tanzania and in 2002 the Ghana and Rwanda offices were established 
(Morrissey, 2007.) 
  Table 1: UK: Total ODA to Sub Saharan Africa, Gross Disbursements  
1215.48 1005.23 1471.36 2303.4 3826.56 5510.83 2703.22 2536.44 2533.23 2953.02
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: OECD Stat Extracts  
The table shows how the British aid increased significantly in 2006 due to British 
commitment in the G8 summit in 2005. However, its disbursements have fallen since 
2007 due to the global rescission thus it has not been able to meet its commitment to 
increase the share of ODA in the GNI by 2013.  
Tanzania and Ghana have been the main destinations of British aid flows. The good 
performance of Ghanaian and Tanzanian governments in applying economic and 
political reforms has encouraged the UK to sustain its aid flow to increase them. The 
Minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham in 2010 affirms on the good performance of 
Ghana and Tanzania; he says, 'deploying wealth equitably through society will be 
essential for prosperity in the long run. In Ghana and Tanzania, with their strong 
institutions, they have been able to turn exciting opportunities to turn wealth from 





Table 2: UK: Total ODA to Ghana and Tanzania, Gross Disbursements  
Recipient
Ghana 129.22 281.06 121.25 169.55 152 150.77 156.67 168.32
Tanzania 311.66 217.65 220.34 218.88 230.79 254.4 216.66 241.95
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 20102007
 Source: OECD Stat Extracts 
However the table shows the aid allocations to Tanzania are more than Ghana; what's 
more, the disbursements have been increased after the global economic crisis. This 
raise might be interpreted as the UK affirms in the white papers that it attains to 
allocate its aid to the poorest countries. Tanzania is still one of the poorest countries, 
though the high growth rate reached to 7%, the severe poverty is dominated in 
addition to inequality of income distribution.  
Regarding Denmark, Tanzania was the first focus area of DANIDA after its 
establishment in 1963. Denmark strongly supported Nyerere's socialist policies and 
the Arusha model, it was explained that 'he [Nyerere] was inspired by the Nordic 
model' p. 14, therefore, Denmark sent lot of experts to Tanzania and from the period 
of 1962-1975, Tanzania ranked the third recipient of Danish aid (Jesper Heldgaard og 
Jeppe Villadsen, 2012.)  
As mentioned in the chapter two Danish aid policy is based on concentration on few 
countries with covering large development themes. Accordingly it focuses on 25 poor 






Table 3: Denmark: Total ODA to Sub Saharan Africa, Gross Disbursement   
427.6 396.75 442.16 510.41 589.17 749.31 833.63 884.17 838.33 813.73
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
 Source: OECD Stat Extracts 
The table shows how Danish aid has increased extensively; it is reflected the large 
share of ODA in GNI as it exceeds 0.8%. Notably there is significant increase after 
2005 because of the international interest in poverty in Africa since this year.   
Evidently, Tanzania has been major recipient country because of sharing the political 
premises and its geographic location near to the Middle East and the NATO 
operations in the Horn of Africa; while DANIDA started its operations in Ghana in 
1989 and its first intervention through Danish NGO providing educational services 
(Demark in Ghana website.) 
Table 4: Denmark: Total ODA to Ghana and Tanzania, Gross disbursements 
Recipient
Ghana 56.7 59.72 56.71 66.15 72.13 85.41 88.38 102.04
Tanzania 90.2 95.5 84.82 95.31 90.07 119.24 106.85 129.45
2008 2009 20102007Year 2003 2004 2005 2006
 Source: OECD Stat Extracts 
Though Denmark in the Africa Strategy (2007) has classified Ghana and Tanzania 
with other African countries that received Danish aid as ' the poorest performance 
countries', the Table 4 shows a significant different of aid amounts allocated to 
Tanzania and Ghana as Tanzania has been receiving large disbursements.  
Concerning the focus development areas, both Denmark and the UK prioritize poverty 
reduction operations that are designed according to the PRSPs thus there have not 
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been great contradictions between the national priorities and donors' priorities. 
However, Denmark has deployed its priorities in protecting human rights and 
migrations to the Ghanaian strategy and it has employed the East Africa integration in 
Tanzanian strategy (Denmark in Ghana website and Denmark in Tanzania website.) 
Regarding aid modality, Denmark and the UK have channeled part of their ODA to 
the national budget 'multi donor budget support'. Denmark started to support the 
Tanzanian national budget in 2001 (Denmark in Tanzania website); however, it 
stopped its flows to the budget in 2006 because of corruption (African Forum and 
Network on Debt and Development, 2007). While in Ghana, the UK came in the 
second rank after the EU in channeling disbursements to the MDBS in 2010 its share 
was 35% of the total allocation and Denmark came in the seventh rank after 
Netherlands and Japan (National Development Planning Commission, 2011.) 
In Tanzania, a part of adopting sector wide approach, DAINDA has channeled its 
disbursements to the 'basket fund' with DFID and other bilateral and multilateral 
organizations in the health sector; local development program; public sector reform 
and the reform of the public financial management. (African Forum and Network on Debt 
and Development, 2007 and the Government of Tanzania and Development Partners, 
2004.) 
On the other side, DANIDA and DFID with other bilateral donors have used joint 
funding in programs targeted improving the business environment and monitoring 
public expenditure (the Government of Tanzania and Development Partners, 2004.) 
In Ghana, Denmark has applied the same approach and it coordinated from 2007 to 
2010 with Netherland in managing the fund allocated to water and sanitation sector 
and DFID delegated Denmark to lead the operations in this sector.  
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Further, Denmark and the UK have coordinated in conducting environment 
assessment; preparing joint programs to develop the transportation sector and 
economic governance.  They have used 'pooled fund' in the programs of enhancing 
the capacity of private sector.  
Denmark has led the operations in justice sector and it has taken the leadership to set 
common financial arrangements in the decentralization program; while DFID has co-
led with the UNDP the operations attained democracy and civil society. Above that, 
DFID has delegated the EC and CIDA in education and transportation sectors and in 
agriculture programs (G-JAS, 2007.)  
Apparently, Denmark usually takes the driver seat and that is reflected its foreign 
policy objectives while the UK prefers to delegate the authority to the appropriate 













The thesis is trying to explore the causes behind the limited implementations of the 
principle of harmonization. It examined the international scope as represented in 
Rome Declaration on Harmonization; Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and 
ACCRA Agenda. These international declarations have tackled financial and 
administrative aspects of harmonization. The Rome Declaration elaborates the 
benefits of employing financial harmonization and entailing administrative reforms. 
The Paris declaration has been more precise as it sets indicators to measure the 
performance of donors and recipient countries. Nonetheless, the commitments in the 
international declarations have not been mandatory commitments; donors could 
determine the level and aspects of cooperation with the recipient government or 
among each other according to their circumstances.  
What's more, the new global partnership that will replace Paris Declaration has not 
illustrated how this new architecture will monitor the performance of donor and 
recipient countries to meet their commitments; further, it has not explained if the new 
donors from developing countries will be committed to the Paris Declaration. 
Therefore the new global partnership has broadened aid architecture with the 
attainment of creating alternative resources for development but without identifying 
the techniques of measuring the effectiveness of development. What has been 
discussed the rationale of the new partnership and grand principles of the inclusive 
partnership and the South- South cooperation; this international approach will return 
back the relation between donors and recipient countries before the Paris Declaration.  
Concerning the regional policies to manage harmonization, European Union and 
African countries have tackled this principle from different approaches. The EU has 
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emphasized on promoting coordination among its member states; while African 
countries have handled it as a factor in its relations with the external world. African 
countries on regional level have not developed detailed criteria to reform their 
administrative and financial systems further they have not set guidelines to assist 
countries in persuading donors to harmonize their operations. 
The second chapter discussed the aid policies of the UK and Denmark; both of them 
met their commitments to Paris declaration. Their aid polices as declared in their 
strategies have been affected by the Paris principles on aid effectiveness. 
Consequently the aid architecture became a determinant of aid harmonization besides 
traditional motives of foreign aid 
According to the proposed framework to measure the scope and the degree of 
harmonization between the UK and Denmark, the relation between them has reached 
the collaboration level; however, this collaboration is based on multilateral 
arrangements identified by the Nordic Plus and the EU. Both DFID and DANIDA 
have online database of their operations around the world; moreover, the OECD and 
Europe Atlas disseminate the different financial operations of DAC members. Thus 
the relation between the UK and Denmark has exceeded the first level 'consultation'. 
On the other side, allocating aid to fragile states became a focus area thus they have 
passed the level of cooperation. Through the Nordic Plus, Denmark and the UK 
agreed on procedures of delegated cooperation and the joint procurement and that 
reflects the level of collaboration.  
Regarding the content of cooperation, Denmark has applied different approach in 
cooperation. It has not cooperated with any donor just with the ' like minded' countries 
and that is appeared in its operations in Ghana and Tanzania, Denmark has hardly 
cooperated with other donors and in case of cooperation it has taken the driver seat. 
106 
 
While the UK has built the cooperation on the comparative advantage thus it has 
delegated the financial or administrative authority to other donors in Tanzania and 
Ghana. On the other side, Denmark and the UK have shared information and agreed 
on financial procedures.  
Despite the cooperation in procedures and practices, there are no bilateral agreements 
between the UK and Denmark and all different aspects of cooperation in Tanzania 
and Ghana have included other European donors in addition to Canada and Japan and 
multilateral organizations.  
Geographically, Ghana and Tanzania are major recipients of British and Danish aid. 
Though the historical ties between Tanzania and Denmark and between Ghana and 
the UK, Tanzania have been receiving large disbursements form both donors.  
Concerning the division of functions in the recipient countries, the PRSPs have 
determined the objectives and areas of intervention; therefore, there is no great 
different between Denmark and the UK in targeted areas. However, Denmark has 
adopted programs and projects that have been compatible with its aid policy besides 
supporting the national strategy. Further, as mentioned earlier, Denmark's policy is 
based on concentration on few countries with the proliferation of projects; for that 
reason, Denmark has hardly delegated cooperation and it has taken the lead of 
harmonized sectors in Tanzania and Ghana as a way to project its influence.   
Accordingly, British and Danish aid have not been fully harmonized and when they 
agreed on aspects of harmonization, they conducted that on multilateral level; though 
trade relation is a critical factor in their mutual relation.  
The aid policies of Tanzania and Ghana elaborate how the political will and the level 
of economic prosperity could determine the cooperation among donors. The Ghanaian 
aid strategy has included detailed aspects of coordination with the government and 
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among donors in addition to the responsibilities of the government and donors to 
obtain cooperation. This concerted strategy has reflected the capabilities and skills of 
the Ghanaian bureaucrats; moreover, there is clear national goal proclaimed in the 
national development strategies which is to be a medium income country by 2020. 
According to this ultimate goal, the Ghanaian government has been managing its local 
and external resources and utilizing the received aid. Additionally, the natural 
resources (cocoa and oil) have enabled the government to negotiate better with 
donors.   
On the contrary, the spread of poverty and inequality of income distribution in 
addition to the absence of strategic natural resources have forced the Tanzanian 
governments to depend on aid. On the other side, the aid policy has designed on the 
five Paris principles not on its national development strategy; moreover, it has 
emphasized on the cooperation between the government and donors and determined 
the commitments and responsibilities that the government has to meet. The ineffective 
role of the Tanzanian government has not reflected the precedence of Tanzania in 
formulating the rules of delivering aid in 1995 via Helleiner's report.  
Accordingly, the policies and the capacity of recipient countries affect the scope and 
degree of aid harmonization.  
Regarding the perspectives on African intellectuals, Samir Amin (2009) proposed 
'Alternative Development' to delink aid relations as drawn by the Western powers and 
institutions. It has five main dimensions: 1) a diversified system of production in 
order to start industrialization and the driving forces are state and local enterprises. 2) 
Social infrastructure to promote health and education; here, technical aid could afford 
reasonable impact. 3) Regional cooperation that reflected national needs and priorities 
not the liberal globalization. 4) Rural and agriculture development to secure food 
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production; however, Amin asserts that rural not urban development and farmers 
prosperity should be the ultimate goal of development. 5) Delinking external 
dependency through building regional institutions such as regional monetary funds; 
promoting regional markets and utilizing regional natural resources.  
While Tandon (2009) developed a strategy to end aid dependency that focusing on 
economic dynamics in the state. The strategy consists of sequential seven steps:  
1- Adjusting the mindset to reorient power relations: 'psychological liberation' of 
whole nation is a core component to define the best way to cut aid 
dependency. 
2- Budgeting for the poor not for the donors:  adopting bottom –up approach in 
planning the national budget in order to reflect the poor needs and priorities 
not donor agenda.  
3- Putting employment and decent wages upfront:  providing labor force in rural 
areas with advanced training, technology, financial resources and adequate 
social protection policies. 
4- Creating the domestic market and owning domestic resources: develop 'a 
domestic demand – led strategy' to ensure food and energy security and to 
improve laws and regulations of land property, wages and tariffs.  
5- Plugging the resource gape: decrease externalized expenditure to increase 
savings then cancel the resources gap.  
6- Creating institutions for investing national savings: develop the physical and 
social infrastructure to facilitate domestic investment; in addition to 
strengthening financial national institutions namely the central banks. 
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7- Limiting aid to national democratic priorities: confining donors' intervention 
in national political structure through their calling for democratic governance 
and monitoring and evaluating national practices.           
Tandon argues that adopting this strategy will not end aid disbursements from the North to the 
South but it will restructure the bases of aid relation with essential emphasis on national needs 
and priorities.   
To end 'aid colonization', Murithi (2009) believes in regional integration accompanied 
with democratic governance to improve the state capacity in mobilizing and allocating 
its resources. On the other hand, he supports the notion of 'ethical aid' when aid 
allocated in transparent and integrated manner. Community participation in 
formulating fields of aid allocation is essential to aid decolonization.     
Dr. Talaat Abdel-Malek (personal communication, May 17, 2012) the co-chair of the 
OECD Working Party on Aid Effectiveness asserts that the capability of the recipient 
country determines the scope and the level of aid effectiveness. To lead harmonized 
operations, the recipient country has to formulate well defined development strategy; 
determine the national resources and the amount of supplementary resources from 
ODA; determine the comparative advantage of each donor; apply effective monitoring 
system and conduct comprehensive evaluation shows the responsibilities of each part.  
Dambisa Moyo, in her prominent book 'Dead Aid' (2009), urges for decreasing aid 
gradually and utilizing it. Her proposal to 'dead aid' is more likely to the idea of the 
new global partnership, she recommends fostering the regional trade; attracting the 
foreign direct investments with allocating them in productive sectors and stimulating 
the local resources through reforming banking system and encouraging SMEs. 




The aforementioned perspectives reflect part of the reality and part of solution; Amin, 
Tandon and Murithi have well examined the current aid architecture; identified 
drawbacks and criticized its components. However, their proposals tackling grand 
good principles without developing actions under each principle further they have 
disregarded the role of political elite as a prerequisite to implement suggested 
strategies. I think it is worth to discuss how to limit the corruption of political elite 
and to convince them with the new paradigm of aid relation or 'adjusting the mindset' 
as Tandon argues. Additionally, they did not handle the procedures of fostering 
regional integration.  
On the contrary, Dr. Abdel-Malek and Moyo developed their perspective from the 
current situation. Dr.Abdel – Malek has tried to refine the current architecture through 
confirming on increasing the ability of developing countries in negotiations with 
donors to adopt their needs and priorities. While, Moyo suggests mechanisms to 
empower the poor in the developing countries and utilize the received aid. However, I 
disagree with her and with other scholars who perceive China and India the best 
alternative to traditional donors. The scholars' arguments are built of the legacy of 
Africa is a poor country and need the others solidarity.  
My point of view is the African perspective to end aid dependency needs more 
development to entail well defined minor actions and tools under each principle to 
implement it and to modify the current aid relation gradually. That is what donor 
countries and institutions have been doing they are focusing on developing minor 
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